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ABSTRACT 
The collapse of rapid growth in industrialized 
countries in the mid-1970s has suggested to scholars that 
Keynesian economic management is not the ultimate way to 
run a viable capitalist system. What has emerged from the 
crisis is the recognition that different capita list 
countries have for long had distinctive patterns of 
development and alternative patterns of economic 
management. 
One such form of economic management is neo-
corpora tism. The pillars of "neo-corporatism" are found 
in the tri-parti te alliance between centralized trade 
unions, centralized employers· organizations, and the 
state. These institutions coordinate the levels of 
investment, wage, and employment in the economy to ensure 
structural change without high inflation or mass 
unemployment. 
Another major form of economic management is the 
industrial policy approach. The supporters of industrial 
policy argue that the success of East Asian countries is 
due to centralized active role of the state in 
formulating a vigorous economic system which promotes 
capital accumulation, innovation, and productivity 
growth. 
The recent rise of the New Institutional Economics 
reminds us that the market is not the only nor even the 
predominant way in which our economic life is organized. 
As a third pattern of management, it emphasizes that non-
market institutions are integral parts of socio-economic 
life and not unfortunate "rigidities" which have to be 
eliminated. 
In this study, I apply the new institutional 
economics to assess the economic development of South 
Africa. I critically evaluate the role of markets and 
states in the development process. I emphasize the need 
for a democratic compromise to rid South Africa of deep 
social, racial and ethnic divisions. I argue that a 
democratic compromise may allow the state space for 
policy effectiveness. I conclude that a policy mixture of 
the state, markets and institutions may take South Africa 
back to higher levels of economic growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The debate about the role of the state in economic 
development demonstrates the power of infinite repetition 
as a weapon of modern scholarship. Neoclassical 
economists argue that the more successful developing 
economies show relatively little intervention in the 
market and conclude that developing countries should 
shrink the size of state and remove many of its 
constraints on the market. 
State interventionists argue that neoclassical 
economists have their facts wrong: the most successful 
cases show "heavy" or "active" intervention. They 
conclude that governments can, in some circumstances, 
guide the market to produce some better industrial 
performance than a free market, even in the absence of 
nee-classical type market failure. But neither side has 
been noticeably enthusiastic to specify just what 
evidence would be consistent with its position and what 
would not. 
The New Institutional Economics asserts that the 
market is not the only predominant way in which our 
economic life is organized.1 It has shown that non-
icoase ( 1937), Coase ( 1960), Simon ( 1983) are the seminal 
works in this tradition. Williamson (1975) has established itself 
as a modern classic. For more recent theoretical developments, see 
Williamson (1985), Matthews (1986). 
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market institutions are integral parts of socio-economic 
life and not unfortunate "rigidities" which have to be 
eliminated. By applying the new institutional economics 
I critically examine the South African Political Economy. 
I contend that apartheid was created to redefine property 
rights and thus reduce transaction costs and improve 
productivity. However, the state failed to anticipate the 
unintended consequences of its institutional plan and in 
the face of new demands by Africans who were excluded, 
the apartheid institutional coordinating framework 
collapsed. I emphasize the urgent need for a democratic 
compromise to rid South Africa of social, rac::i,.al and 
ethnic divisions. 
In chapter one I critically evaluate the government 
failure, market failure, morality and political economy 
literature on the role of the state. In chapter two I 
introduce the new institutional economic theory of state 
intervention. Chapter three evaluates the development of 
South Africa. Chapter four and chapter five discuss the 
importance of institutional innovation and I argue that 
neither the state nor the market alone can solve the 
coordination problem of independent but interdependent 
agents. I conclude that a policy mixture of the state, 
markets and institutions may take South Africa back to 
higher levels of economic growth. 
3 
CHAPTER 1 
The Role of State Intervention: A Literature Review 
Introduction 
Coordinating economic activity of independent, but 
interdependent agents with divergent interests and 
dispersed knowledge is a puzzle for economists. Classical 
economists concern themselves with coordination within 
economic enterprises and between economic enterprises. 
Neoclassical economists focus specifically on 
coordination between economic enterprises with the market 
playing a crucial role. Welfare economists convincingly 
spell out why markets in some instances fail and what 
kinds of interventionist measures the state could play to 
correct them. 
Recently economists have become critical of the 
conventional approach. The New Institutional Economics 
looks at not only market coordination but also on non-
market coordination within and between enterprises. What 
has become clear is that effective coordination both 
within economic units and between such units can only be 
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achieved at a cost. By introducing the costs of achieving 
coordination, or transaction costs, the New Institutional 
Economics effectively breaks away from neoclassical 
tradition in which perfect coordination is achieved 
without any costs. By regarding the market as just one of 
many alternative economic institutions, the new 
institutional economics establishes that the efficient 
operation of the market depends on many other 
institutions. In particular, the state not only plays the 
role of ultimate guarantor of property rights and other 
legal forms, but also intervenes extensively in order to 
establish the market as an institution. 
In this chapter the discussion is in four parts. In 
the first section I review the literature that is 
concerned with the failure of the market and potential 
remedies. Next I review the state intervention debate; 
should the state intervene when there is market failure? 
Then I review the literature concerning the role of the 
state: does the state serve some "public" or "social" 
purpose other than satisfying individual or group 
interests? Finally, I summarize the New Institutional 
Economics literature concerning the ability of the state 
to intervene effectively. I contend that the new 
institutional economics by recognizing that state 
intervention carries certain costs is able to avoid the 
naive view of state intervention as the ultimate solution 
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to the coordination problem. At the same time, by 
recognizing that allocating resources through the market 
is also costly, the new institutional economics is able 
to reject the biased view of government failure 
literature which argues that the cost of state 
intervention invariably exceed the cost of market 
transaction. Thus the seemingly "institution free" 
mechanism is sustainable only as part of the complex 
fabric of various institutions. 
1.1 The Market Failure Literature 
The market failure literature concerns not only the 
failures of markets to equate private and social costs 
and benefits but also the remedies to these failures.2 
Traditionally this literature concerns public goods, non-
competitive markets, and externalities. 
1.1.1. Public Goods 
Goods and services are either private or public. 
Non-buyers cannot be excluded from consuming a public 
good whereas they can be excluded from consuming a 
private good. Because of the free rider problem, society 
tends to understate its preferences for public goods 
2Baumol (1965) is a classic exposition of the literature. See 
also Stiglitz (1988). 
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(Schotter, 1981; pp. 57-63). Therefore public goods are 
underprovided due to the free-rider or collective action 
problem (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982). 
Individual rationality thus leads to collective 
irrationality, and it is argued that the state should 
intervene to provide public goods. Unfortunately Peacock 
{1979) argues that non-excludability is not permanent. 
Technological innovation can eliminate the "publicness" 
of some goods by solving the problem of non-
excludability. Even if there is a public (collective) 
good, Olson (1965) argues that the public good may be 
provided without state intervention because it is likely 
that a small group of individuals who benefit from the 
public good will provide it unilaterally. Even in large 
groups when this condition does not obtain, state 
intervention is not always necessary because "selective 
incentives" in the form of private goods provided by the 
"political entrepreneurs" can overcome the free-rider 
problem by bringing individual cost-benefit structures in 
line with the social (group) cost-benefit structure 
(Olson, 1965; Popkin, 1979). These arguments do not allow 
us to conclude, however, that the public goods problem 
can always be solved by private initiatives; in some 
cases the use of state coercion (e.g. taxation) may be 
the only possible way to remedy the situation. 
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1.1.2. Non-competitive Markets 
Where an individual producer's decisions affect the 
quantity and price in a market economy, collusive 
behavior eliminates perfect competition. But when 
monopoly and oligopoly prevail in a market, the quantity 
of goods supplied is smaller than in competition and 
consequently some of the consumer surplus is transferred 
to firms in the form of "monopoly profit" or rent; such 
transfers impose a "dead-weight loss" on society. Some 
argue that in these circumstances it is justifiable for 
the state to intervene by the use of regulatory agencies, 
dissolution, divorce, divestment, or public ownership 
(Chang, 1990) . 
A powerful argument against state intervention to 
"correct" non-competitive markets is based on the theory 
of the Second Best (Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956). If one 
monopoly element exists, it is sometimes better to 
introduce a second monopoly element to achieve 
efficiency. Reducing the number of monopolies to the 
minimum does not necessarily bring efficiency once 
monopoly has been introduced somewhere in the system. The 
theory of the Second Best maintains that rectifying 
suboptimal conditions such as monopolies in some but not 
all markets, may not necessarily improve the efficiency 
of the economy. Anti-interventionists argue that no gain 
is guaranteed by anti-trust intervention which does not 
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eliminate "distortions" from all markets (Peacock & 
Rowley, 1979) . This argument, however, does not undermine 
the interventionist argument because the theory of Second 
Best does not imply that there can be no gain from such 
intervention, but only that it cannot be guaranteed. 
Another anti-interventionist argument is that state 
intervention is a major source of market failure. For 
example, Friedman ( 1962) argues that, "monopoly 
frequently, if not generally arises from government 
support of collusive agreements among individuals". The 
implication is that the state should stop meddling with 
the market if it is serious about correcting distortions. 
In the words of Von Mises (1979): 
"it is absurd to see the government ... point its 
finger at business, saying: ~There are cartels, 
therefore government interference with business is 
necessary J • It would be much simpler to avoid 
cartels by ending government J s interference with the 
market - an interference which makes the carte ls 
possible {such as protectionism)". 
Although there can be no doubt that state-administered 
entry barriers are often a source of monopoly, many 
initially competitive markets have been transformed into 
non-competitive ones without collusion or state 
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intervention through business cycles, structural change, 
or even sheer luck. Indeed, if the assumption of self-
perpetuating competitive markets is unrealistic, it may 
be pointless from the public policy point of view to 
argue for or against state intervention in monopolistic 
markets since there is no criterion according to which 
they are to be corrected other than the fictitious 
perfectly competitive market (Demsetz, 1982). 
1.1.3. Externalities 
Externalities exist when an individual's activities 
affect the welfare of others. This leads to a discrepancy 
between the private cost-benefit structure and the social 
cost-benefit structure. Interdependence among individual 
activities cannot be a problem in itself, but where its 
effects are properly compensated for, there arises an 
"untraded interdependence", namely, externality. 
This problem may be overcome by defining property 
rights more precisely and facilitating negotiations 
between the parties affecting and affected by 
externalities. However, it may be impossible to do so 
because of the "transaction costs" arising in acquiring 
information, in negotiating, and in enforcing contracts 
( Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1975). In the absence of such 
Coasean solutions when externalities exist the state is 
justified in intervening to ensure the provision of goods 
9 
in socially optimum amounts. For example, the state may 
intervene by subsidizing goods with positive 
externalities such as education, health, social 
infrastructure and research and development and taxing 
when there exist negative externalities (pollution). 
Some anti-interventionists try to dismiss the 
externality argument for state intervention by assuming 
that the magnitudes involved are negligible. Baumol 
(1965) and others have pointed out, however, that the 
list of externalities can be extended almost infinitely. 
Production of most goods creates a negative externality 
in the form of pollution. Hirschman (1958) argues that 
many goods may additionally have positive externalities 
which he calls forward and backward linkages. For example 
agriculture supports industry by supplying raw materials. 
Hirschman would refer to this as a forward linkage. When 
industry supplies agriculture with fertilizer, Hirschman 
would refer to it as a backward linkage. Some economists 
even argue that the absence of some goods say basic 
foodstuffs, 
(Schotter, 
can create er ime, 
1981). Once we 
a negative externality 
begin to accept the 
pervasiveness of externalities, it seems questionable to 
justify market transactions at all. The important issue 
is not whether externalities exist or not, but to explore 
under what conditions market transactions should be 
adopted and under what conditions non-market institutions 
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including state interventions should be adopted, as the 
New Institutional Economics has recently shown. 
Other anti-interventionists argue that correcting 
one set of externalities leads to another. Friedman 
\1962) has grave reservations against state intervention 
based on externalities argument or "neighborhood 
effects". He points out that intervention: (a) will in 
part introduce an additional set of neighborhood effects 
by failing to charge or to compensate individuals 
properly; and (b) creates externalities by reducing 
freedom. This is unconvincing since: (a) whether the 
gains from eliminating existing externalities are smaller 
than the losses from the newly-created externalities 
cannot be determined a priori; and {b) unsolved 
externalities also imply a loss of someoneJs freedom. 
1.2 Morality, Paternalism and Contractarianism 
An important element in the traditional 
interventionist argument is that the state, at the cost 
of efficiency must intervene in the market to achieve 
equity or welfare. 
1.2.1. Paternalism and Contractarianism 
These arguments for state intervention usually take 
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two forms. First, it is argued that the state should 
intervene to provide "merit goods" which society (as 
distinct from the preferences of the individual consumer) 
wishes to encourage (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1984; p. 78). 
Second, state intervention may also be justified if the 
society believes that the market is not an acceptable 
means of achieving a goal. For example, blood donations 
or police services are activities of this sort. In this 
case the state as social guardian should remove the 
activities from the domain of the market. 
This type of argument is often branded as 
paternalism by those who believe in methodological 
individualism and its politico-philosophic counterpart, 
Contractarianism (for an exposition of Contractarianism, 
see Nozick, 1974). From the point of view of 
methodological individualism, paternalism is flawed in 
that it attaches an independent will to society which is 
no more than a collection of individuals. From the 
politico-philosophic point of view, the belief that the 
state should decide what and how individuals should 
produce and consume 
serfdom" (Hayek, 
is a first step on the "road to 
1972). Those who believe in 
Individualism-Contractarianism argue that: 
"the individual and not the group should be the 
basic repository of rights and obligations. Thus, it 
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is believed that "individuals should be allowed, 
within defined limits, to follow their own values 
and preferences rather than somebody else~s ..... It 
is this recognition of the individual as the 
ultimate judge of his ends, the belief that as far 
as possible his own views ought to govern his 
action, that forms the essence of the individualist 
position" (Hayek, 1972, p. 59). 
This position does not assume that mankind is egoistic or 
selfish or ought to be (Hayek, 1972; p 59). No other 
person or authority, however, can impose its own ethical 
judgement on the individual since the individual knows 
best his situation and options. Any interference with the 
making of individual decisions is seen as violating the 
innate right for freedom of the individual (Hayek, 1972, 
1988; von Mises, 1929, 1979;Friedman, 1962). 
If we would rather not introduce any exogenous 
ethical code other than the individual being the judge of 
her destiny, Contractarianism, whether of the Hobbesian 
or the Rawlsian variety, becomes the only consistent view 
of the state, or more generally, of politics. As Buchanan 
says, 
"if politics is to be interpreted in any 
justifactory or legitimatizing sense without the 
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introduction of supraindividual value norms, it must 
be modelled as a process within which individuals, 
within separate and potentially differing interests 
and values, interact for the purpose of securing 
individually valued benefits for cooperative effort. 
If this presupposition about the nature of politics 
is accepted, the ultimate model of politics is 
Contractarian (Buchanan, 1986, p 240). 
The ideal state is then the product of voluntary 
contracts between free individuals who gain from 
restricting the unfettered exercise of individual free 
will of individuals. Contractarianism in its most 
consistent form should be based on the unanimity rule. 
Otherwise, however fair the outcome of a politico-
economic system may appear from some other point of view, 
it cannot be justified from the Contractarian viewpoint. 
Imposing a decision on individuals, however, violates the 
fundamental principle that individuals should be free to 
make contracts and not to be coerced to any transaction, 
however beneficial it may appear to an outsider. 
1.2.2. What should the state do? 
On the basis of Individual-Contractarianism, it is 
argued that any state intervention other than some 
"minimal" functions is illegitimate because it violates 
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individual freedom as the ultimate value in human 
society. According to Peacock and Rowley (1979), 
"Liberalism" is "prepared to trade off economic 
efficiency for individual freedom where such a policy 
conflict becomes apparent".3 
Von Mises ( 1979) categorically states that "the 
government's only legitimate function is ....... to 
produce security" (p 40). To him, any intervention is 
doomed to invite more intervention leading eventually to 
socialism. There is no such thing as "the third way" (von 
Mises, 1979). 
Except in areas which can be justified on 
Contractarian grounds and intervention in the non-
exchange economic activities, such as production 
services, Hayek (1972) argues that state intervention is 
bound to erode individual freedom. Competition and its 
prerequisite, freed om of entry, are seen as the best 
means of coordinating the economy "not only because in 
most circumstances it is the most efficient method known 
but even more because it is the primary method by which 
our activities can be adjusted to each other without 
coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority" {Hayek, 
1972; p. 36). That is, state intervention is 
3The Liberalism of Peacock and Rowley is Libertarianism. They 
argue that this argument should be differentiated from Paretian 
arguments, because the latter are ends oriented whereas the former 
is process oriented. 
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objectionable 
fundamental 
primarily 
values of 
Contractarianism. 
because it 
Individualism 
violates the 
and hence 
According to Buchanan { 1986) the state functions 
that can be justified on Contractarian grounds are found 
in three levels of collective action. The first level is 
enforcement of the law. The second level is financing and 
providing public goods and services. The third level 
involves changes in legislation or in the rules of the 
game. Unless there is an unanimous case for changes in 
the basic rules of the game of society, the role of the 
state should be the enforcement of the rules of the game 
through protection of property rights and the enforcement 
of voluntary contracts and provision of public goods. 
Milton Friedman states that "the role of 
government .... is to do something that the market cannot 
do for itself, namely to arbitrate, and enforce the rules 
of the game" (Friedman, 1962; p 27). This view is similar 
to that of Buchanan, but Friedman is much more generous 
and more vague about state intervention than the strict 
Contractarians. His list of legitimate functions of the 
state include maintenance of law and order; definition of 
property rights; service as a means whereby people modify 
property rights and other rules of the economic game; 
adjudication of disputes about the interpretation of the 
rules; enforcement of contracts; promotion of 
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competition; provision of monetary framework; engagement 
in activities to counter technical monopolies and to 
overcome neighborhood effects widely regarded as 
sufficiently important to justify government 
intervention; supplementation of private charity and 
private family in protecting the irresponsible; whether 
madman or child (Friedman, 1962; p. 34). Denouncing any 
moral judgement other than narrowly defined individualism 
as the Contractarian economists tend to do is as 
meaningless as citing moral reason for state intervention 
without discussing the role of morality in our social and 
economic life. 
1.2.3. Some Thoughts 
Individualism is not a "scientific" view free of 
values; it is just another form of morality. 
Individualism also assumes that each individual knows 
best her interest and the constraints she faces, but this 
view is also not without problems. First, there are 
individuals who even the Contractarians do not regard as 
wholly responsible (madman and children). The borderline, 
however, between the "normal" and the "abnormal" is a 
thin one, as Friedman admits (Friedman, 1962; pp 33-34). 
Thus who has the right to decide who is responsible and 
who is not? Second, there is no "intrinsic reason why 
individuals should always pursue their own good or why 
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they would do so better than others could do for them". 
As Goodin (1986) notes, people make decision with 
incomplete information, with ignorance of their future 
preferences, with ignorance of the full consequences of 
their own actions, under deceptive decision-making 
frameworks and with a desire to avoid responsibility for 
risks. The existence of the implicit preferences (e.g. 
reckless drivers and drug addicts are not to be seen as 
acting in their best interests) is another case in point. 
In such situations, it is not clear whether we should 
regard individual decisions as the manifestation of their 
preferences. 
In Contractarian philosophy, it is argued that the 
state cannot be regarded to be "above" individuals, since 
it is a product of free contracts among independent 
individuals. Contractarians hypothesize a "state of 
nature" in which all individual are free to make 
contracts but compete against everybody else; this leads 
to the need for the imposition of an extra-individual 
authority through voluntary contracts in the form of the 
state to prevent socially undesirable forms of 
competition. 
The "state of nature" scenario is, of course, 
fiction. During the history of humankind, the choice has 
been between one form of authority or another, a choice 
between anarchy and authority, as the Contractarians put 
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it (Nozick, 1974). Even a cursory look at the history of 
the last few centuries reveals that modern states were 
built by rulers and not by freely-contracting 
individuals. Thus it is in contradiction to historical 
fact to argue that market transactions brought about the 
state. The market is a newer social institution, newer 
than other forms such as the state. As Polanyi (1957) 
persuasively puts it, historical experience shows us 
that, 
"the road to the free market was opened and kept 
open by an enormous increase in continuous, 
centrally organized and controlled interventionism. 
To make Adam Smith ~simple and natural liberty' 
compatible with the needs of a human society was a 
most complicated affair. Witness the complexity of 
the provision in the innumerable enclosure laws; the 
amount of bureaucratic control in the administration 
of the New Poor Laws which for the first time since 
Queen Elizabeth's reign were effectively supervised 
by central authority; or the increase in 
governmental 
meritorious 
administration entailed in the 
task of municipal reform ...... . 
Administrators had to be constantly on the watch to 
ensure the free working of the system. Thus even 
those who wished ardently to free the state from all 
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necessary duties, and whose whole philosophy 
demanded the restriction of state activities, could 
not but entrust the self-same state with the same 
powers, organs, and instruments required for the 
establishment of laissez-:taire" (p. 140). 
Most Contractarians are not so silly as to believe 
in the "state of nature" as an historical reality. 
Buchanan argues that the Contractarian argument is an ex 
post conceptualization or legitimization of the political 
process as complex exchange relationship and not an ex 
ante moral justification of the existing political order 
(Buchanan, 1986; p. 247). He thus admits that the 
Contractarian argument is not based on actual history but 
on some arbitrary belief. Nozick (1974) tries to defend 
the state-of-nature explanation saying that, 
"we learn much by seeing how the state could have 
arisen, even if it did not arise that way. If it did 
not arise that way, we also would learn much by 
determining why it did not; by trying to explain why 
the particular bit of the real world diverges from 
the state-of-nature model is as it is" (Nozick, 
1974; p. 9). 
This is peculiar logic. Since it is definitionally 
impossible that two or more different end states arise 
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through the same process, it is hardly justifiable to 
introduce one of them as a "potential explanation" (as 
Nozick calls it) of the other. Of course, there may be 
some heuristic value in the exercise, but this advocacy 
based on heuristic value can only be fully justified when 
the "as if" explanation is complemented by the "as it 
was" one, unless it can be shown precisely why the "as 
if" explanation is superior to the "as it was" one. 
More importantly, Contractarianism does not 
guarantee a minimal state. If there is an unanimous 
belief, for example, among the members of society that 
market transactions like blood donation are not morally 
acceptable in some areas, for example, taking such 
activities out of the market may be justified even from 
the Contractarian point of view. What if the individuals 
in the society gather together to write a new "social 
contract" which endorses an interventionist state? It is 
not satisfactory to argue for a minimalist state on the 
assumption that individuals will opt for a minimal state 
if they are given a chance, unless we can show that 
individuals are wealth-maximizers and that the free 
market will ensure them to maximize their wealth; this is 
a common assumption in economics, but nothing more than 
an assumption. 
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1.3. The Political Economy Literature 
The Political Economy viewpoints, both on the left 
(Marxists) and the right (Chicago School) of the 
political spectrum, have for long criticized the Market 
Failure approach for too readily assuming that the state 
will act like Plato~ s Philosopher King and serve the 
public. In what follows I will examine three arguments 
that question the assumption that the state serves the 
public: the autonomous state approach, the interest group 
approach, and the self-seeking bureaucrats approach. 
1. 3.1 The Autonomous State Approach 
The view that the state should be regarded as "a 
dynamic independent force" with its own objective 
function which is distinct from that of the society as a 
whole is not new (Findlay, 1990; p. 195). Originating 
from Marx~s Eighteenth Bruimaire of Louis Bonaparte 
(Marx, 1934), the Marxist tradition recognizes that a 
state may acquire "autonomy" from society if no class is 
powerful enough to impose its will on it. 4 One strand in 
the recently popular Neoclassical Political Economy goes 
a step further and characterizes the state as a 
"predator" which as a monopolist develops property rights 
4For Marxist theories of the state, see Miliband (1969) and 
Jessop ( 1982) . 
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and a tax system to maximize its "profit" or net revenue 
(tax minus expenditure), even at the expense of social 
productivity (see Colander, 1984; Mueller, 1979; Findlay, 
1990).5 Neoclassical Political Economy recognizes that 
revenue-maximization by the state is an exercise in 
constrained maximization, since the threat of "takeover" 
by an alternative ruler from within or from without of 
the country imposes a "competitive constraint" (see 
North, 1981; Findlay, 1988). 
The view that the state may act as an entity with 
its own will is a fascinating one, especially when the 
traditional simplistic interest group approach has 
treated the state as a black box in which interest groups 
feed their "policy inputs" ( Skocpol, 1985). The approach, 
however, is not without problems. 
First, the approach naively treats the "autonomous" 
state as a unified entity. As recognized even by one of 
the earlier proponents of the predatory state approach, 
the richer institutional context of the modern polity 
with a bureaucracy and a working legislature makes it 
difficult to apply this simplistic model to the analysis 
of real life examples (North, 1990). In fact, the most 
5According to Neoclassical Political Economy, what 
differentiates the market from the polity is not the different 
behavioral principle of the participants but the different 
constraints that they face. One of the many names of this emergent 
school is the economics of politics (Buchanan et al. , 1978), 
Neoclassical Political Economy (Colander ed., 1984). 
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distinctive characteristic of the modern state is the 
development of institutional bounds on arbitrium (Poggi, 
1990). In particular, the "necessity of developing agents 
to monitor, meter, and collect revenue" {North, 1990; p. 
190) introduces a complication in the form of the 
conflict of interest between the ruler who wants to 
maximize net revenue and the bureaucrats who want to 
maximize the budgets of their own bureaus. 
Second, talking of state autonomy in abstract does 
not help us understand real life problems. We must look 
at state autonomy as a matter of degree which depends on 
the issues. Different states may have different degrees 
of autonomy in different areas. The Swedish state for 
example may be less autonomous than the Korean state in 
influencing investment decisions of capitalists, but it 
may be more autonomous in taxing them. Whether or not one 
should assume autonomy of the state depends on the 
country one looks at, the time period one wants to study, 
and the areas of policy in which one is interested. 
1. 3.2 The Interest Group Approach 
Another group of arguments which questions whether 
the intentions of the state serve its own interest rather 
than societyJ s is what is called the interest group 
approach. This approach sees the state as an arena 
within which economic interest groups or normative social 
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movements contend and ally with one another to shape the 
making of public policy decisions" about "the allocation 
of benefits among demanding groups" (Skocpol, 1985). 
Since the most powerful groups will be the most able to 
affect the decisions of the state, state economic 
policies will be inevitably biased towards them. 
The most representative of these theories is the 
"regulatory capture" theory of the Chicago School. 
According to Stigler (1975), the pioneer of this theory, 
"regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed 
and operated primarily for its benefits" through 
subsidies, entry restrictions, restrictions on 
substitutes, subsidies to complements, and price-fixing. 
Political control over this process is limited by the 
infrequency of voting and the high cost of acquiring 
information on the side of voters (Laffont and Tirole, 
1988). Introducing the problem of collective action 
(Olson, 1965) in a more explicit manner, Pelztman (1976) 
argues that the reason why producers and not consumers 
capture the regulatory agency is that their smaller 
number makes collective action easier. This version of 
the interest group approach prescribes that the best way 
to avoid possibility of regulatory capture is to deprive 
the state of the power to regulate. 
Some Marxists have argued along similar lines, 
although with different political connotations. They 
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argue that the state whose existence depends on the 
reproduction of the dominant mode of production in 
society has to serve the interest of the economically 
dominant capitalist class in that society if it is a 
capitalist system (Miliband, 1969). In the simpler 
version of the theory, the state is seen to defend the 
capitalist class interest even at the cost of individual 
capitalist's interests. In this view, the solution to the 
problem of divergence between "public interest" and the 
objective of the state is to overthrow capitalism and rid 
the system of class divisions and power so that the 
"public" will become the whole society. 
The interest group approach is useful as a broad 
framework to understand politics since it enables us to 
see how "the public" is not a homogenous entity but is 
made up of diverse groups which struggle with each other 
to affect the decisions of the state. Apart from some of 
the sophisticated Marxist versions, however, this 
approach has shortcomings. 
First, many versions of the approach do not 
adequately discuss the problem of collective action. As 
pointed out by Olson ( 1965), and Hardin ( 1982), the 
traditional theories of interest groups lboth pluralist 
and Marxist varieties) have too readily assumed that all 
existing interests will be represented. Even if people 
have identical preferences, however, they are not 
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necessarily able to act them out due to the difficulty of 
collective action. Studies in the tradition of the theory 
of collective action have shown which groups can assert 
their interests depends on how large the group is and 
whether it is feasible to devise some selective 
incentive/sanction scheme. In addition, the frequency and 
duration of the interaction among the members of the 
group and ideology (North, 1981) also is one important 
factor in successful collective action. 
There is also the problem of "agenda formation". It 
is not true that all interests can be organized, once the 
configuration of the group is such that the free-rider 
problem can be overcome. How interests are represented 
depends on which issues are more easily put on public 
agenda. Social norms (ideologies) prevent some issues 
from appearing on the agenda for public action; thus it 
is almost impossible to organize an interest group around 
such issues. As Kitching (1980) has pointed out, 
"Certain kinds of argument, powerful though they may 
be in private deliberations, simply cannot be put in 
public forum although both individual material 
interests and the interests of particular groups and 
classes are still essential forces at play in the 
politics ..... the form in which those interests are 
publicly expressed and argued over allows for a real 
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~distance' to open up between political and public 
debate and those interests" ( p. 61). 
The motivation and the capacity of the state also become 
important variables in determining what kind of policy 
alternatives can be discussed, adopted and implemented 
because government leaders and the bureaucrats often take 
initiatives well beyond the demands of social groups 
(Skocpol, 1985). In other words, the existing form of 
politics, the structure of the state apparatus, the 
prevailing ideologies etc., all affect what kinds of 
interest groups could and would be formed ( Skocpol, 
1985). 
Third, most versions of interest group approach do 
not adequately deal with the process of interest groups 
politics. Rather, their analysis is "structuralist" in 
the sense that the outcome of interest group politics is 
seen as predetermined by systemic parameters. Given such 
a static view of politics, it is more than natural that 
the proponents of the approach think that the problem of 
"biased representation" will never be solved without 
destroying the existing social structure (for example, a 
return to the minimalist state or a Socialist 
Revolution). However, what matters in reality is not just 
whether a particular social structure let some groups 
dominate but also the nature of the process of gaining 
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such dominance. For example, in some South Asian 
countries mobilization of clientilist groups has become 
a major channel for the distribution of profits, with 
some detrimental consequences for capital accumulation 
(Bardhan, 1984). As another example, in Latin America the 
fractured nature of the society produces a volatile 
pattern of capital accumulation where a growth cycle 
starts only to be quickly disrupted by hyperinflation. 
Thus a major social upheaval like a military dictatorship 
austerity program must occur to permit growth to resume 
(Fishlow, 1990). Interest group politics may be properly 
understood only when the particular process of contest 
for political and economic rights in the society 
concerned is analyzed in detail. 
1.3.3. The Self-Seeking Bureaucrats Approach 
This theory is based on the postulate that 
bureaucrats are in no sense different from individuals in 
pursuing their own interests. It is absurd to believe 
that one and the same individual will behave 
altruistically in the off ice and behave egoistically 
after office hours. It is assumed that the bureaucrats 
are budget-maximizers. Niskanen (1973) argues, for 
example, that "among the several variables that may enter 
the bureaucrats motives are salary, perquisites of the 
office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of 
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the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing 
the bureau". All except the last two are positive 
functions of the total budget of the bureau during the 
bureaucrats tenure (Niskanen, 1973). Since the 
bureaucrats derive utility from higher salaries and 
greater power of their bureaus, it is rational for them 
to maximize the budget of their bureaus rather than to 
optimize social output. 
Although the vote-maximizing behavior of politicians 
may impose some constraints on the size of the budget 
(because politicians who have to be re-elected do not 
want high taxes), the outcome is likely to be in favor of 
the bureaucracy. This is due to the fact that the 
politicians are at informational disadvantages concerning 
the cost function of the bureaus, not only because they 
lack the expertise to estimate such functions but also 
because state bureaus which are in monopolistic positions 
have no criterion to gauge their efficiency (Mueller, 
1979). The politicians, even when they are somewhat 
public-minded, are limited to monitoring the bureaucracy 
according to the crude criterion that the total cost of 
state expenditure should not exceed total benefits. It is 
thus argued that the rational and selfish bureaucrats 
produce goods and services in more than socially optimal 
quantity. 
The self-seeking bureaucrats approach can be 
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criticized on the following grounds. First, the scope for 
the realization of bureaucratic self-interest through 
overprovision of public goods and services differs 
according to the institutional setting and the political 
process around the bureaucracy. For example, if 
bureaucrats are recruited through strict tests (as in 
Japan or Korea), it is more difficult to expand bureaus 
than when a higher official can recruit anybody whenever 
she wants. Also, if the state acts as a "predator", it 
has an incentive to underprovide rather than overprovide 
public goods and services (Eggertsson, 1990) and thus 
mitigate the tendency of overprovision due to the 
bureaucratic self-seeking. Even in societies where the 
"principal" is the diffused public, bureaucrats are not 
totally free to do whatever they want. Given its claim to 
be a "public" agency, the bureaucracy is more vulnerable 
to what are termed "voice" checks - say, media criticisms 
- than private firms are (on the concept of" voice , see 
Hirschman, 1970). Historically there have been 
institutional developments within modern states that keep 
bureaucrats from wielding arbitrary powers such as 
competitive exams for appointment; auditing of the 
expenditure; the principle of equality of citizens before 
the law; expectation that office-holders will operate on 
the basis of the law, their superiors~ directives, and 
their own "science" and "conscience"; surbodination of 
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the bureaucracy to ultimate political decisions (Poggi, 
1990; pp 75-6). 
More importantly, bureaucrats can and do act in a 
fashion which is not solely self-interested. Often 
bureaucrats think of themselves, and act to promote it. 
One such reason is that "public-spiritedness", "altruism" 
and so on are often held as a genuine principle and not 
as a thin veil to disguise self-interest. Second, 
bureaucrats are constantly asked to conform to the 
organizational objectives of the state and are always 
under some degree of pressure to promote the "national" 
or "public" interest. 
As the interest group approach emphasizes, groups in 
society engage in struggles to ensure property rights 
over productive assets, to claim more resources from the 
state budget, to restrict property rights and the 
distributive claims of other groups, and in this process, 
try and sometimes succeed in influencing the state to 
their advantage. It would be problematic to interpret 
every policy as an outcome of interest groups politics 
because the state not only responds to interest groups 
demands but often takes initiatives for good or bad 
reasons. In this respect the autonomous state approach 
which treats the state as an entity with its own 
objectives is a useful conceptual approach. The state 
apparatus, however, is made up of bureaucrats who act as 
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the "agents" of the ruler. The principal-agent problem 
makes it impossible to assume that the state is a unified 
entity without looking at individual cases in terms of 
the strength of the hierarchy within the bureaucracy, 
independence of the high-ranking bureaucrats, the 
prevalent ideology within the bureaucracy, the recruiting 
method, and so on. 
There can be no presumption that the state will act 
for the public interest, as is usually assumed in 
standard Welfare Economics. It is equally inadequate, 
however, to employ another sweeping assumption as to the 
objectives of the state, like net-revenue maximization or 
budget-maximization. What kind of objective function the 
state operates under depends on the kind of interests 
that can be formed and be acted out as a pressure on the 
state, the resistance of the state to these demands, the 
objectives of the top politicians, the strength of 
control over the bureaucracy, the strength of the 
hierarchies within the bureaucracy, the means of 
recruitment of bureaucrats, and the prevalent ideology 
within the bureaucracy and a host of other factors. 
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1.4 The Government Failure Literature 
The information problem and rent-seeking are two 
important arguments against state intervention. When the 
state contemplates a policy, it needs to spend resources 
to collect and process information in order to formulate 
the possible alternatives and make decisions. Even after 
the decision the state needs to collect and process 
information necessary to monitor compliance of the lower 
level bureaucrats, on the one hand, and of the groups and 
individuals at whom the policy is targeted on the other. 
Part of the information problem is that of insufficient 
information. According to this argument, the state simply 
"does not know better" about the future course of events; 
this information can only be gathered at prohibitive 
costs. 
The theory of rent seeking argues that state 
intervention incurs not only information costs but also 
costs in the form of diversion of resources into 
"unproductive" activities by private agents to capture 
rents generated by state intervention (Buchanan et al, 
1980; Colander, 1984). In this section I will introduce 
the New Institutional Economics approaches of controlling 
the information problem and rent seeking through 
organizational innovations. 
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1.4.1. The Information Problem 
An important dimension of the information problem is 
informational asymmetry called the principal-agent 
problem (Stiglitz, 1988). There are two types of 
informational asymmetry in relation to state 
intervention. First, there is informational asymmetry 
between the top decision-makers and the lower level 
bureaucrats within the state apparatus. 6 The classic 
example is the prevalence of "shortages" in socialist 
economies due to the attempts of the managers of the 
state-owned enterprises to secure enough inputs by 
understating their technological capabilities (Ellman, 
1989). Second, there exists informational asymmetry 
between the state and the policy "target" entities such 
as firms, income groups, and individuals. A good example 
is the existence of firms under infant-industry 
protection which persistently fail to grow out of 
"infancy" in many developing countries. Whatever its 
source, informational asymmetry means that the state may 
not be able to effectively implement its policies unless 
srn this sense the self-seeking bureaucrats approach is also 
partly an information argument. However, it is included in the 
Political Economy literature because of its emphasis on the 
difference between the objectives of the public, or the top 
politicians, and the bureaucrats. Asymmetric information problem 
would exist even if the bureaucrats genuinely want to serve the 
public interest, because of the limited scope for knowledge 
transmission (Hayek, 1949 and 1978). 
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it spends enormous resources to overcome the asymmetry 
(Chang, 1990). Al though the information problem is a 
serious handicap to effective state intervention it can 
be exaggerated. 
Problems of information collection and processing 
exist for state intervention only because the rationality 
of individuals who make up the state apparatus is 
"bounded" (Simon, 1983) . According to Simon ( 1983) , 
individuals are rationally bounded when they have 
incomplete information about alternatives. Overcoming the 
limitations of individual rationality is the raison 
d~etre of human organizations, including the state 
apparatus (Stinchcombe, 1990). If this is the case, it is 
unreasonable to criticize the state for having 
"insufficient" information while assuming that private 
organizations know everything they need (Chang, 1990). 
Concerning the problem of asymmetric information 
within the state apparatus, note that the problem exists 
in any organization of reasonable size, not only within 
the state apparatus. The fact that organizations 
including the state develop and function reasonably well 
shows that there are ways and means to mitigate the 
principal-agent problem; one way, for example, is by 
designing appropriate organizational structure and 
promoting organizational loyalty. Asymmetric information, 
moreover, may exist between the state and the policy 
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"target" groups, but it also exists between the parties 
in private contracts. The fact that private transactions 
which involve high informational asymmetry are conducted 
routinely shows that there are ways to control this 
problem as well as through organizational innovations. 
1.4.2. Rent-Seeking 
Another argument against state intervention is that 
when the state creates rents, economic actors expend 
resources to pursue these rents, but these expenditures 
are "wasted" from society's perspective. It should be 
emphasized that rent seeking is different from profit 
seeking. Profit-seeking activities refer to taking 
advantage of market opportunities in order to increase 
oneJs legitimate profits. The resources expended on rent 
seeking, however, are said to be spent on attaining 
profit from inefficiency such as in a state-franchised 
monopoly position. 
There are several problems, however, with the rent 
seeking theory and other conceptions of created waste. 
First, this conception of waste assumes that the 
prevailing structure of rights is correct. Rights change 
only when there is a challenge to or competition for a 
right. This inevitably involves the expenditure of 
resources. To label such expenditure as "waste" presumes 
that rights should not be changed, that the status quo 
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structure of rights is in some sense "natural". Buchanan 
does as much in the following passage: 
"So long as governmental action is restricted 
largely, if not entirely, to protecting individual 
rights, personal and property, and enforcing 
voluntarily negotiated private contracts, the market 
process dominates economic behavior and ensures that 
any economic rents that appear will be dissipated by 
the forces of competitive entry .... If, however, 
governmental action moves significantly beyond the 
limits defined by the minimal or protective state, 
if government commences, as it has done on a 
sweeping scale, to intervene piecemeal in the market 
adjustment process, the tendency toward the erosion 
or dissipation of rents is countered and may be 
wholly blocked .... Hence, attempts will be made to 
capture these rents, and the resources used up on 
such attempts will reflect social waste .... Rent-
seeking activity is directly related to the scope 
and range of government activity in the economy" 
(Buchanan, 1980; pp. 8-9). 
The state is in the business of rights creation and 
recreation. There is no a priori basis upon which one can 
declare one rights arrangement "natural" and others 
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unnatural. There are no rights apart from the state. By 
enforcing certain claims and rejecting others, the state 
de facto determines who has rights and who does not. 
Because the state is the source of all rights, it has the 
power also to change rights, to remove rights from one 
group and give them to another. It is the very function 
that Buchanan is protesting against in saying, that rent 
seeking emerges under normally predicted circumstances 
because political interference with markets creates 
differentially advantageous positions for some persons 
who secure access to valuable rights (Buchanan, 1980; 
p .11). However, Buchanan fails to realize that the market 
system was not created out of a vacuum. Rather, the 
market system evolved due to rent-seeking behavior on the 
part of individuals and groups who were "losers" under 
the mercantile system. That is, the structure of rights 
was altered in their favor. As Commons (1934) has noted: 
"In Jurisprudence this expansion is reflected in the 
expansion of common law from the protection of 
tangible property and persons in an age of violence 
to the protection of business and positions (that 
is, intangible as well as tangible property) in the 
peaceful expansion of markets. In politics it is the 
mass movements of individuals, organized or 
unorganized, which bring about the transition from 
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the prerogative to sovereignty, from personal 
government to the collective bargaining of King, 
landlords, and merchants, then of corporations, then 
of employers and employees. Together, these made 
possible the further evolution, in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth centuries, of those incorporeal and 
intangible properties, whose value consists, not in 
their physical uses but in the going business and 
jobs of going concern" (Commons, p. 314). 
Thus while the market is made out to be the 
naturally efficient system, a standard from which by 
comparison waste is measured, there is no inherently 
natural structure of rights. This is rather a device used 
to imbue the advocated rights structure with an aura of 
"correctness" where no such thing is possible. Since all 
legal change involves an artificially created transfer by 
the state, it is seen as wasteful under the neoclassical 
definition of waste. Since there is no a priori reason to 
label any other structure of rights "correct" vis-a-vis 
all others, there is no reason that any given expenditure 
of resources can be labelled "wasteful" apart from a 
particular view of the world with its associated 
normative forms (Medema, 1991). 
Second, the determination that these rent-seeking 
expenditures are wasteful from a social perspective 
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because they do not increase the value of social output 
is also presumptive of the form of the social welfare 
function. Resources expended in getting the right to vote 
for women and blacks are wasted from the neoclassical 
economic point of view, but this assumes that the value 
of output that would have been generated by those dollars 
is more important than for all citizens to have the right 
to vote for those who represent them in government. 
Further, if we assume that individual utility functions 
have items besides the value of social output as 
arguments and we further assume that the social welfare 
function is the weighted sum of the individual utilities 
of all the members of society, assumptions certainly 
consistent with neoclassical economic theory, then one 
cannot say, even within a given rights structure, that 
rent seeking is wasteful. Brooks, Heijdra and Lowenberg 
( 1990) have demonstrated that expenditures by those 
seeking rents go into the pockets of others - middlemen, 
such as lobbyists, and those who grant the rent-producing 
right. These revenues increase the utility of those 
receiving them, and hence increase social welfare under 
the assumption that social welfare is some function of 
individuals' utilities. Thus, resources expended on rent 
seeking are only wasted subject to a specific rights 
structure and a specific, non-utility-based social 
welfare function associated with competition. 
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Even with the assumption of a given rights structure 
and a given social welfare function, there are at least 
two types of situations where rent seeking cannot be 
considered wasteful. The first is where such expenditures 
are information-enhancing. The second is in the presence 
of X-inefficiencies or other non-profit-maximizing 
behavior. For example, assume management engages in a 
form of satisficing behavior such that they must satisfy 
a minimum profit constraint to keep shareholders happy 
and hence to keep their jobs, and that the difference 
between this position and the profit maximization 
position is "wasted" in the form of managerial 
perquisites. Then, the opportunity to attain some sort of 
rent-garnering position presents itself and resources are 
expended to that end while still satisfying the minimum 
profit constraint. 
Since rents are inevitably created and reallocated 
through changes in the rights structure as well as 
through changes in inter-agent relations in society, we 
need to move toward an analysis which assesses the impact 
of alternative rights/rent (institutional) structures. 
When we recognize the ubiquity and inevitability of rent 
seeking, the idea of waste assumes at best a secondary 
role. If we cannot prevent, or even minimize, rent 
seeking activities, then whether or not such activities 
are wasteful becomes much less interesting. This is 
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especially important when the idea of rent seeking as 
waste is used as an argument for so-called "small 
government" . 
In the public policy realm, the decision as to 
whether to alter social arrangements should be made in 
the light of the merits of the claims of competing 
interests. It is the rent-seeking process that brings to 
light these competing claims. The issue is not more 
versus fewer rents, but rather rents for whom. The 
resolution of this issue depends on the goals that are 
set for society, and how different distributions of 
rights fit in with these goals. 
Conclusion 
I have discussed various attempts of coordinating 
economic activity. Neoclassical economists assume an 
instantaneous and costless recontracting with the 
coordination problem solved at no costs. Welfare 
Economics convincingly spells out why markets may fail 
and what kinds of interventionist measures the state can 
employ to correct them. 7 However, as many economists 
7Market failure does not necessarily mean that state 
intervention is the solution. As the New Institutional Economics 
argues, the history of capitalism is full of institutional 
innovations to deal with the failures of the market to coordinate 
individual activities. The rise of the factory system, the rise of 
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from across the political spectrum argue, welfare 
economics is based on a naive set of assumptions about 
the nature and the ability of the state. Even if we do 
not accept the Contractarian argument that the state as 
the product of a social contract among free individuals 
has no right to intervene in the market, we still have 
two thorny questions: does the state really serve the 
public interest, and what if the state cannot achieve 
what it sets out to do? 
Responding to the above questions I examined four 
approaches - namely, the autonomous state approach, the 
interest group approach, and the self-seeking bureaucrats 
approach - and concluded that none of them on its own can 
provide generalized assumptions about the objectives of 
all states, regardless of the time and space where they 
exist. I suggested that in order to establish a 
reasonable set of hypotheses concerning the objectives of 
a particular state we should look more carefully at the 
process of interest group formation and collective action 
as well as the operation of the bureaucracy in the 
particular system of political economy in which the state 
is operating. In doing so, the insights from all the four 
approaches reviewed can fruitfully be used. However, we 
are still unable to suggest how government failure may be 
joint stock companies, the rise of multidivisional firms, the rise 
of vertical integration and conglomeration are but a few of such 
innovations (Langlois (ed), 1986). 
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remedied other than by non-intervention. Does it mean 
that we are condemned to accept failing markets in favor 
of failing governments as the lesser of the two evils? 
The New Institutional Economics, by recognizing the 
market as just one of many alternative institutions and 
that state intervention carries certain costs, breaks 
away from the conventional wisdom in which perfect 
costs. In this coordination is achieved 
framework, the state and 
without 
the market are among many 
possible economic institutions or coordinating mechanisms 
which incur different transaction costs in order to 
resolve the coordination problem (Pagano, 1985). In the 
next chapter I introduce the transaction costs of the New 
Institutional Economics. Then I will tackle the South 
African industrial development as a real problem to apply 
the theories developed in this chapter and the next. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The New Institutionalist Theory of State Intervention 
Introduction 
Development processes of developing countries are 
considerably different from those of the industrialized 
countries, in both the speed of development and the 
productive and organizational structures of industry 
emerging from them. Furthermore, these differences in the 
speed and character of industrial development are to a 
considerable extent the results of institutional 
arrangements different than those in an established 
indue;trialized country. In addition, the intellectual 
climate within which industrialization proceeds, its 
"spirits" and "ideology", differ considerably among 
developing and developed countries. 
Development is a most important challenge facing 
developing countries, and coordination of economic 
activities is a central issue in development. In chapter 
1 I discussed the role of the market and the state and 
argued that both carry certain transaction costs. In this 
chapter I introduce the new institutional economics 
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theory of state intervention. The new institutional 
economics seeks to demonstrate that institutions truly 
matter in developed and developing countries. Each 
distinct organizational structure affects incentive and 
behavior and institutions are legitimate objects of 
economic analysis. First, I define institutions and 
recognize the eclectic nature of the new institutional 
economics. Second, I trace out the concept of bounded 
rationality. Third, I expressly introduce the notion of 
opportunism and explore the ways that opportunistic 
behavior is influenced by economic organizations. 
Finally, I discuss the role of transaction costs in 
economic organizations. 
2.1. Defining Terms 
Although institutions are central to development, a 
good definition of institutions is still missing. 
Important characteristics of institutions are the degree 
to which they are (a) organizational, that is, the extent 
to which organizations and institutions coincide; ( b) 
formal; (c) created at a specific time and place by a 
specific means, as opposed to having evolved from more 
diffused sources; (d) embedded in, as opposed to 
differentiated from, other institutions; ( e) universal as 
opposed to particularistic in the interests they serve; 
(f) creating as opposed simply to maintaining a certain 
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public good; and (g) technologically linked (Nabli & 
Nugent, 1989). 
For the present purpose an ins ti tut ion is defined as 
a set of formal or informal constraints which governs the 
behavioral relations among individuals or groups. Formal 
organizations, such as the state, trade unions and 
employers' organizations are institutions because they 
provide sets of rules governing the relationships both 
among their members and between members and non-members. 
Likewise, markets, such as stock exchanges, labor 
markets, credit markets, wholesale markets, and spazas, 
are institutions because they embody rules and 
regulations, formal or informal, which govern their 
operation. Explicit or implicit contracts are also 
institutions in that they lay down rules which govern 
specified activities involving parties to such contracts. 
Similarly, cultural rules and codes of conduct are 
institutions because they constrain the relationships 
between the corporations and the state. In the following 
sections I examine the limitations of the neoclassical 
economic theory in examining the development process in 
developing countries using what will be identified as the 
new institutional economics. 
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2.2. The Neoclassical Assumption of Economic Behavior 
Traditional economic theory postulates an "economic 
man," who, in the course of being "economic" is also 
"rational." This man is assumed to have knowledge of the 
relevant aspects of the environment which, if not 
absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and 
voluminous. He is assumed also to have a well-organized 
and stable system of preferences, and a skill in 
computation that enables him to calculate which of the 
available alternatives permit him to reach the highest 
attainable satisfaction. 
Recent developments in economics and particularly in 
the theory of business firms have raised great doubts as 
to whether this schematized model of economic man 
provides a suitable foundation on which to erect a 
theory. I suggest that the global rationality of the 
economic man should be replaced with a kind of rational 
behavior that is compatible with the access to 
information and the computational facilities that are 
possessed by institutions and individuals in the kinds of 
environment in which they operate. 
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2.2.1. Bounded Rationality 
Rationality denotes a style of behavior that is 
appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the 
limits imposed by given conditions and constraints 
(Williamson, 1975 & 1985). A theory of rational behavior 
may be concerned with the rationality of individuals or 
the rationality of organizations or both. The classical 
theory of the firm in its simplest form provides a useful 
standard for comparing and differentiating rationality. 
In the theory of the firm, the given objective is to 
maximize profits subject to demand and cost functions. To 
do this there must be perfect knowledge of the 
constraints (Simon, 1983). 
Bounded rationality is the cognitive assumption on 
which the economics of transaction costs relies. An 
economizing orientation is accepted by assuming the 
intended rationality part of the definition, while the 
study of institutions is encouraged by conceding that 
cognitive competence to achieve rationality is limited 
(Williamson, 1985). Thus rationality is bounded. Under 
this framework, more study of both the market and non-
market forms of organizations is requisite. How do the 
parties organize so as to utilize their limited 
competence to best advantage? Views to the contrary not 
withstanding, the set of issues on which economic 
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reasoning can usefully be brought to bear is enlarged 
rather than reduced when bounds on rationality are 
admitted (Williamson, 1985). 
The theory of economizing under bounded rationality 
takes at least two forms. One concerns decision 
processes, and the other involves governance structures. 
Transaction costs economics is concerned with the 
economizing consequences of assigning transactions to 
institutions in a discriminating way. Since interaction 
is not costless, the cost of planning, adapting, and 
be considered monitoring transactions need to 
(Williamson, 1985). Which institutions are more 
efficacious for which type of transaction? Since 
information and rationality are limited, opportunism 
occurs which decreases efficiency and equity. 
2.2.2. Opportunism 
Opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted 
disclosure of information when there are calculated 
efforts to mislead, 
confuse (Williamson, 
real or continued 
distort, obsfucate, or otherwise 
1985). It is responsible for the 
condition of asymmetry which 
complicates the problem of economic organization. The 
literature of transactions costs emphasizes that 
conditions that are subject to ex post opportunism will 
benefit if appropriate safeguards can be devised ex ante. 
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As Williamson (1985) puts it, "rather than reply to 
opportunism in kind, the wise prince is one who seeks 
both to give and receive ~credible commitments'." 
One of the implications of opportunism is that the 
~ideal· cooperative form of economic organization that is 
characterized by trust and good intentions is very 
fragile. 
exploited 
Such 
by 
an organization is 
agents who do 
easily invaded and 
not possess those 
qualities. "High minded" organizational forms that presume 
trustworthiness and are based on nonopportunistic 
principles and thus are rendered unviable by the 
intrusion of unscreened and unperalized opportunists 
(Williamson, 1985). Such an intrusion of opportunistic 
agents can be avoided according to theory of transaction 
costs. 
2.3.1. Transaction Costs 
Transaction cost economics is part of the new 
institutional economics. Although transaction costs 
economics applies to the study of economic organization 
of all kinds, I focus on the state as an institution 
since it affects markets and relational contracting. I 
extend the transaction cost approach to political 
exchange to explore the interaction of political and 
economic institutions in the development of polities and 
the economy. 
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Transaction costs can be understood as embracing all 
the costs that are connected with (a) the creation or 
change of an institution or organization and (b) the use 
of institutions or organizations. The creation, 
enforcement, and the restructuring of institutions and 
the "rules of the game" in an autonomous community 
represent activities which are associated with the first 
kind of transaction costs ( Furubotn & Richter, 1991). 
Adam Smith (1776) noted that these costs increase with 
the increasing development and complexity of 
civilization. Following this classic categorization, the 
three basic "duties of the sovereign" are to provide for 
defense, the legal system and "public works and public 
institutions". In addition there are expenses of running 
the state (Smith, 1776). These transaction costs are 
still largely neglected in the discussion of neoclassical 
economic theory. 
The second type of transaction costs has been given 
relatively greater attention because economists tend to 
be more interested in the problems of firms and markets 
than in constitutional questions and problems of 
government infrastructure (Coase, 1960; p. 15). In 
commenting 
transaction 
on Coase's interpretation 
costs, Dahlman (1979) has 
following observation: 
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of market 
offered the 
"A natural classification of transaction costs 
consistent with Coase·s definition can be obtained 
from the different phases of the exchange process 
itself. In order for an exchange between two parties 
to be set up it is necessary that the two search 
each other out, which is costly in terms of time and 
resources. If the search is successful and the 
parties make contact they must inform each other of 
the exchange opportunity that may be present, and 
the conveying of such information will again require 
resources. If there are several economic agents on 
either side of the potential bargain to be struck, 
some costs of decision making will be incurred 
before the terms of trade can be decided on. Often 
such agreeable terms can only be determined after 
costly bargaining between the parties involved. 
After the trade has been decided on, there will be 
the costs of policing and monitoring the other party 
to see that his obligations are carried out as 
determined by the terms of the contract, and of 
enforcing the terms of the agreement reached. These, 
then, represent the first approximation to a 
workable concept of transaction costs: search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, 
policing and enforcement costs" (pp. 147-48). 
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Thus, according to Dahlman transaction costs are (a) 
the costs of initiating contracts; ( b) the costs of 
concluding contracts and; (c) the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing the performance of contracts. Since there is no 
framework which allows us to integrate institutional 
analysis into political economy, the key to developing 
such an analytical framework is the underlying costs of 
exchange. 
Political rules broadly specify the hierarchical 
structure of the polity, its basic rules, and the 
specific characteristics of agenda control. Economic 
rules define property rights. Property rights are the 
bundle of rights over the use and the income to be 
derived from property and over the ability to alienate an 
asset or a resource. Given the initial bargaining 
strength of the decision-making parties, the function of 
rules is to facilitate economic and political exchanges. 
The existing structure of rights and character of their 
enforcement defines the existing wealth maximizing 
opportunities of the players which can be realized by 
either forming political or economic exchanges. 
2.4 Political and Economic Institutions: A Rejoinder 
According to the transaction cost theory of the new 
institutional economics, institutions that evolve to 
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lower these costs are the key to the performance of 
economies. When transaction costs are absent, the initial 
assignment of property rights does not matter from the 
point of view of efficiency because rights can be 
voluntarily adjusted and exchanged to promote increased 
production. But when transaction costs are substantial, 
the allocation of property rights is critical. 
In the historical growth process there is a tradeoff 
between economies of scale and specialization on the one 
hand and transaction costs on the other. In a small, 
face-to-face peasant community, for example, transaction 
costs are high because specialization and division of 
labor are severely limited by the extent of markets 
defined by the personalized exchange process of the small 
economy. In a large-scale complex economy, as the network 
of interdependence widens the impersonal exchange process 
gives considerable scope of all kinds of opportunistic 
behavior and the cost of transacting can be very high. In 
industrialized societies complex institutional structures 
have been devised. These strcutures such as elaborately 
defined and enforced property rights, formal contracts 
and guarantees, corporate hierarchy, vertical 
integration, limited liability and bankruptcy laws, were 
devised to reduce the uncertainty of social interaction, 
in general to prevent transactions from being too costly 
and thus to allow gains from productivity of large scale 
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and improved technology to be realized. 
2.3.1. How New Institutions Emerge 
North (1981) has explained economic growth in 
Western Europe in terms of innovation in the 
institutional rules that governed property rights. In 
this view, as in the Marxist history, property relations 
which were socially useful at one time become "fetters" 
on the further development of the forces of production 
and an appropriate redef ini ti on of political ins ti tut ions 
becomes necessary. New institutions that allow an 
increase in gains from trade by economizing on 
transaction costs including gains from new production or 
exchange which were unprofitable under earlier high 
transaction costs and market failure emerge. Institutions 
are perceived as systems that help individuals process 
information and manage uncertainty by establishing rules, 
norms and habits. 
2.3.2. An Institutional Economics Framework 
Hodgson, (1988) proposes a theoretical framework of 
the new institutional economics through his analysis of 
the firm. Firms, according to Hodgson, are created to 
overcome problems of "structural uncertainty." Structural 
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uncertainty not only motivates the emergence of the firm, 
it also describes the environment faced by the firm when 
it searches for information about the quality and prices 
of products and labor. To reduce uncertainty in the 
management of their internal affairs, firms nurture the 
development of cooperative and trustful relationships 
among their employees and encourage organizational 
loyalty. These functions are achieved by the firm, s 
ability to establish and enforce rules, develop norms, 
and offer training programs.The emphasis on rules and 
norms is applicable to political institutions. Rules and 
norms play a crucial role in political arena since the 
main function of political organizations is conflict 
resolution. The agreement to follow the rules and accept 
outcomes of the process ensures the existence and utility 
of political organizations. The effective political 
institutions are those that maintain acceptable rules, 
and not necessarily those that produce optimal policies. 
Participants in political organizations are therefore 
likely to direct their efforts toward changing rules and 
norms and not short-term utility maximization. Just as 
the firm was created to preserve the power of 
entrepreneurs, political institutions allocate political 
power. The difference between political and economic 
organizations might be related to the difference in the 
ownership and distribution of political versus economic 
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power and the manner in which these two types of powers 
can be mobilized, utilized and observed. 
In chapter three I discuss how the state in South 
African shaped economic organizations by manipulating and 
enforcing property rights through a system of apartheid. 
I attempt to bring out the theoretical points made in 
this chapter and chapter 1 to show how institutional 
theoretical framework could be presented in a real life 
situation. I argue that the apartheid institutions have 
becoming "fetters" to further development of the forces 
of production and that new institutions should emerge. 
I show that the South African state actions not only 
created pressures for change that caused actors to look 
for new organizational forms, but they also constrained 
and influenced how actors selected different forms. In 
chapter four I suggest that a political compromise may 
reduce the high transaction costs and uncertainty, laying 
a foundation for potential investors. 
However, this study is limited by the fact that 
institutional policy analysis lacks a theory that 
explains which type of political organizations will 
emerge and by which criteria they should be evaluated. 
Because of this weakness in the new institutional 
economics framework some elements of the theory of 
institutions are not integrated in the discussion about 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Political Economy of South African Development 
Introduction 
Industrialization of backward countries is dominated 
by the Marxian assumption that it is the history of 
advanced countries or established industrial countries 
which trace out the road of development for the more 
backward countries. "The industrially more developed 
country presents to the less developed a picture of the 
latter" (Marx, 1961). But one should beware of accepting 
such a generalization too wholeheartedly. For the 
development of a backward country may tend to differ 
fundamentally from that of an advanced country 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). 
The realization that there are different paths to 
development influenced policymakers in developing 
countries to design policies in terms of the attainment 
of specific and identifiable goals which were consciously 
selected in accordance with particular societal assets, 
capabilities and institutional constraints. The South 
African state set out to attain high levels of economic 
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growth by excluding the African majority through the 
introduction of a system of apartheid (pronounced apart-
hate) (Neame, 1963). The state believed that by 
relocating Africans to the reserves, South Africa would 
remain pure and Africans would only come to white areas 
to supply labor and retreat back (Neame, 1963). 
By applying the theories of state intervention and 
transactions costs developed in the previous chapters, 
which acknowledge the diversity of institutions, I 
critically examine the South African political economy. 
First, I present a brief overview of the historical 
origin of South Africa and its economic performance while 
evaluating the mainstream interpretation of its 
development. Second, I discuss the different interest 
groups that rallied around the state particularly the 
white trade unions and capitalist organizations and how 
the relationship between the state and interest groups 
has been changing overtime. 
I contend that apartheid was created to redefine 
property rights and thus reduce transaction costs and 
improve productivity. However, the state failed to 
anticipate the unintended consequences of its plans. The 
rapid economic growth of the South African economy in the 
earlier part of its development mobilized the African 
population. Consequently, different organizations 
representing different sections of the African majority 
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emerged to undermine the state plan and increase 
transaction and information costs. In the face of new 
demands by the African majority who were excluded, the 
apartheid institutional coordinating framework broke 
down. The political instability and declining 
productivity increased the monitoring costs forcing the 
state to negotiate a new political dispensation. New 
institutions must allow Africans to participate as equal 
partners. I contend that political democracy will provide 
stability and thereby minimize risk, transaction costs 
and information costs attracting potential investors and 
laying the ground for a sustainable growth path. 
3.1 A Brief Historical Overview of South Africa 
Until the late nineteenth-century, much of southern 
African history could be told as a story of complex and 
protracted turf wars. But diamond and gold mining changed 
all that. By the end of the century, the region was far 
too important to the global capitalist economy to be left 
to the locals. In a final and brutal exercise of coercive 
power, the British imperial government set about 
subordinating all political communities in the region and 
constructed a central state. 
Creating this state required both a practical 
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negotiation of central power with the existing power 
centers in the region, political as well as economic, 
African as well as settler. Afrikaners (Dutch settlers) 
were incorporated with the British into a single more-or-
less democratic community in a way which cements the 
alliance between the economically powerful English 
speaking whites and the politically powerful Afrikaners. 
African kingdoms were incorporated into the governing 
structures through a modified scheme of indirect rule and 
recognition of certain political authorities within the 
"tribal system". Under the scheme the Crown acting 
through local commissioners assumed an overlordship in 
the name of a fictional "Supreme Chief". 
If those parts of the African population that were 
progressively integrated into the capitalist economy had 
been incorporated into the political community in the way 
in which the working classes were elsewhere, a fully 
national state might have been created in South Africa. 
They were not. A division of a citizenship and 
sovereignty marked by race and serving to justify 
coercive labor practices and white supremacist racism was 
created instead. Apartheid was pre-eminently a racist 
system of controls on movement and residence, framed 
within a state ideology interpreting political and social 
rights in terms of nationalist principles relating people 
to places. In an attempt to improve the economic position 
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of the poor Afrikaners, the National Party (NP) plan was 
designed to banish Africans to poverty stricken 
residences called Native Reserves or Homelands which were 
geographically specified. Malan in 1948 outlined the 
apartheid policy in respect of the Africans as follows: 
* The Native Reserves must be retained and made 
suitable for carrying a larger population by 
protecting the soil against erosion and over-
cropping and by teaching the Native to make the best 
use of his soil by applying better agricultural 
methods. Possible additions must only take place in 
judicious fashion and after thorough investigation. 
* In urban areas inside the European areas Natives 
must be domiciled in their own residential areas 
with proper attention to good housing and other 
healthy accommodation conditions. Only Natives who 
have been assured of work will be admitted, and the 
detribalized ones among them will at all times 
receive preference. Newcomers from the Native areas 
or from the European platteland must be regarded as 
temporary workers and those in excess must be 
repatriated. 
* In view of their possession of their own national 
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home in the Reserves, Natives in the European areas 
can make no claim to political rights. The present 
representation of Natives in Parliament and in the 
Cape Provincial Council must therefore be abolished. 
Representation in the Senate must however continue 
by the election of three European Senators by 
different Native councils and further through three 
others nominated by the government because of their 
particular knowledge of Native affairs, as is now 
the case. These representatives must form a standing 
and permanent committee on Native Affairs. They must 
however have no vote on questions of confidence, or 
on the declaration of war or on measures affecting 
the political rights of non-Europeans. The present 
existing Natives Affairs Commission must give way to 
a more effective commission of experts. 
* The present existing Native Advisory Council must 
be abolished and in its place a system of self-
government on the first-rate and well-tried example 
of the Transkei Bunga called into being - a system 
which will keep proper account of the natural 
groupings among the Natives themselves based on the 
territorial, historical, racial and linguistic 
differences between them. This will give to the 
Natives that opportunity of living out their own 
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aspirations which under the present system are being 
withheld from them and which in their 
dissatisfaction makes them willing prey of the 
Communist agitator. 
* For higher education separate provision must be 
made for Natives and their admission to European 
institutions together with European students must 
end. 
* Administratively all Native interests including 
education must rest with the department of Native 
Affairs and the necessary sub-departments. 
According to Neame (1963) the NP was influenced by 
two factors, namely, the declining number of the white 
population and the rising militancy of African 
nationalism. According to this scheme, different nations 
were entitled to sovereignty over their own homelands, 
and members of these nations were entitled to rights only 
in these homelands. In international terms, apartheid is 
the norm, not the exception. The United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service is typical of 
countries throughout the world, for example, with its 
myriad of largely unaccountable (from the perspective of 
those subject to it) and frequently demeaning procedures, 
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rules, and paperwork and its network of offices and 
operations resembles nothing as much as the pass system 
of apartheid. More than a million immigrants are 
apprehended and removed each year; all others who would 
seek to enter and work are subject to a system of control 
over movement and residence. 
The Group Areas Act gave the NP space to redefine 
property rights restricting residency and mobility of 
Africans and thus reducing uncertainty of social 
interaction. The resulting state that has been formed 
over the last century or so in the south of Africa is 
part imperial and part national. And the experiences of 
those subject to its various aspects are fundamentally 
different. The vast majority of Africans in the region 
have experienced central state power as a clear 
imposition. The imperial state excluded and brutalized 
its subject African population fostering a sense of 
alienation and a desire to destroy its institutions. 
One preoccupation of policymakers throughout the 
twentieth-century history of South Africa has been the 
question of securing African labor. Indeed, legitimizing 
the coercion and control of African people as a source of 
labor has been a fundamental factor in institutionalizing 
the South African state. The concern with labor generally 
had three aspects: first, devising strategies and 
justification to acquire native labor in the capitalist 
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economy; second, controlling the allocation of labor 
between sectors of production; and third, ensuring the 
exploitability and reducing the cost of labor (Ashford, 
1992). 
For most of the time until the 1970s, these policies 
were devised in a context of generalized labor shortage. 
Since the 1960s, and increasingly throughout the 1980s, 
there have been more people seeking to labor in South 
African capitalism than the number of available jobs 
(Simkins, 1983). Throughout the period, institutions of 
the state such as "Homelands", which were strategies for 
extracting cheap labor supplies for indigenous African 
societies, were effectively transformed into dumping 
grounds for people deemed "surplus" to the requirement of 
South African capitalism. Did the South African state 
achieve what it had set out to do? 
3.2. South Africa in Development Perspective 
South Africa is regarded as a medium-sized middle-
income developing country. It has one of the most uneven 
income distributions in the world, and a rapid population 
growth estimated at 2.5% per annum between 1950 and 1980 
(Simkins, 1983, p. 114) . Social indicators reveal in 
Table 3.1 that the country has more in common with lower 
middle-income countries, such as shorter life expectancy 
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at birth and higher infant mortality rate. 
South Africa experiences many of the problems 
typical of countries that have just started 
industrializing such as rapid population growth, powerful 
forces making for urbanization, great inequality, 
political and social instability. 
3.2.1. Inequality and poverty in South Africa 
The high level of racial income inequality and the 
wide urban-rural income differentials indicate that 
poverty is widespread and concentrated within the black 
population. Poverty is particularly prevalent in the 
informal settlement and in the non-metropolitan regions 
(Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). The exact level of poverty, 
defined as the percentage of the population falling below 
a poverty line income (R400 per month), is difficult to 
estimate. Conservative estimates indicate that in the 
mid-1970s over 60 per cent of the population of the 
homelands and over 30 per cent of the black population of 
the metropolitan regions were in a state of poverty. By 
contrast, approximately 4 per cent of the white 
population was estimated to have been in a state of 
poverty in the 1970s (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). 
According to Simkins (1984), this pattern will not have 
changed significantly through to the present time. 
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TABLE 3.1 
South African development status in international 
perspective 
Countries 
Low income 
Mid. income 
S. Africa 
U-mid. inc. 
Indus. 
Per 
capita 
income 
$ 330 
1360 
2470 
3150 
18330 
% share of 
manufacture 
in GDP 
14 
23 
24 
25 
30 
Life inf ant 
expectancy mortality 
at birth rate 
62 
65 
62 
67 
76 
94 
51 
67 
50 
9 
SOURCE: World Development Report, 1992. 
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TABLE 3.2 
Racial disparities in income, living standards, and 
benefits from government expenditure. 
Black 
State per capita expenditure R655,96 
(primary and secondary level) 
(1988/89) 
Matriculated labor force 2.2% 
(% of labor force) 1985 
State social pension (1989/90) Rl,655.10 
(average annual value) 
Income per person (1988/89) R521 
White 
R2,882.00 
R3,334.50 
SOURCE: South African Institute of Race Relations 
Survey 1989/90 
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Inequality in South Africa largely follows racial 
lines. Table 3.2 shows some intergroup inequality. The 
extreme racial inequalities which characterize the South 
African economy are the basis of demands for 
redistribution by the African National Congress {ANC). 
The inequality reflected in Table 3.2 is rooted in 
inequality of opportunity in the market economy. The main 
causes of inequality can be found in the distribution of 
employment opportunities and the level of joblessness, 
the level of earnings in different types of occupation, 
and the distribution of the ownership of wealth and the 
returns earned by different forms of wealth. The limited 
access to education facilities to Africans limit their 
mobility forcing them to unskilled low paying jobs. 
In South Africa as throughout the world, the 
ownership of personal weal th is always more narrowly 
concentrated than the distribution of all incomes, and 
the white share of personal wealth has been estimated to 
account for over 80 per cent of total personal wealth. 
This is a major factor causing and perpetuating income 
inequalities. But the state also directly affects 
inequality through its allocation of education, health, 
pension, housing, urban infrastructure and other 
resources. These inequalities crucially affect human 
capital and thereby market outcomes. For more than half 
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a century, the state has influenced the pattern of 
distribution in the economy. In order to solve the poor-
white problem, the state legislated legislation favoring 
employment of whites, such as the Colour Bar Act. 
Differential investment in human capital by the state 
also had a marked effect on the subsequent skewness of 
income distribution between groups. 
3.3. The Economics of Apartheid 
Different scholars have attempted to understand the 
impact of apartheid on economic growth. To understand the 
impact of apartheid on economic growth it is necessary to 
consider its history. Many current development problems 
have their basis in South African history and are not 
solely the consequences of recent secular economic 
stagnation. Neoclassical economists argue that the South 
African economy has grown at a "remarkably rapid" rate 
from the 1940s to the 1970s (Houghton, 1964; p. 162). 
Radical economic historians contend that apartheid was a 
unique system of social control designed to boost 
economic growth and industrialization in South Africa 
(Wolpe, 1977; Davies, 1991; pp. 20-22). More recent 
studies suggest that apartheid assisted economic growth 
from 1948 until the early 1970s, but began to constrain 
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it thereafter (Gelb, 1987; pp. 33-34). It has also been 
argued that the South African economy is currently in a 
structural slow-growth ~crisis' which is a function of 
the apartheid system itself (Pillay, 1986). The new 
institutional economics places the failures of the 
apartheid economy on the fragmentation of the apartheid 
institutional framework in the face of new demands by the 
African majority who were excluded. 
Since apartheid is such a pervasive social system it 
influences the economic growth performance of South Afri-
ca. Moll (1990) argues that given South Africa's 
resources and capabilities as, say, of 1948 when the 
Nationalist Party came to power, her aggregate growth-
performance since then has been singularly unimpressive, 
quite apart from the social inequalities and poverty, 
under-urbanization, unemployment and the skills 
constraint to name but a few. The low rate of economic 
growth of the last decade and half has accentuated and 
intensified many of these long standing problems. The 
failure to expand employment in the modern sectors due to 
the low.growth and increasing capital intensity has been 
politically destabilizing; political destabilization 
always reduces growth prospects. 
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TABLE 3.3. 
Manufacturing growth in Some Selected Developing 
Countries (average annual growth rates). 
1963-72 1973-78 1979-88 
South Africa 6.8 1.3 1.6 
Korea 18.3 24.7 11. 7 
Brazil 6.7 n.a. 1.5 
Chile 4.1 -2.9 2.7 
Greece 9.7 4.3 0.4 
Mexico 8.7 7.4 0.0 
Singapore 17.0 7.1 6.8 
Spain 10.8 3.3 1.5 
Source: UN, Growth and World Industry, 1973; UN, Yearbook 
of Industrial Statistics, 1979 & 1988: World 
Bank, World Bank Development Report (various 
years). 
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The deterioration in the South African economy can 
be gauged from Table 3.3. The turning point in the mid-
1970s can be seen clearly from this table. The high 
economic growth of the 1960s carried through the first 
half of the 1970s. The international recession following 
the oil price shock did not immediately affect South 
Africa. Exacerbating oil shocks were initial signs that 
the apartheid scheme for reducing information and 
transaction costs was beginning to fail. But once the 
economic downturn had begun, there was no return to 
previous high levels of economic growth. In the second 
half of the 1970s, South Africa could on average grow 
just about enough to keep up with population growth. The 
level of growth was also boosted by the "mini boom" 
caused by a large gold windfall in the 1979 to 1981 
period, but the underlying problems of manufacturing 
weakness and low levels of industrial exports, rising 
government expenditure (partly with long term returns, 
e.g education) and social pressures for higher wages and 
better living conditions re-emerged once the gold price 
fell. 
In terms of relative economic performance, the South 
African economy fell from its moderately successful 
seventh ranking ( 1960-1970) among 20 developing countries 
to an indifferent fourteenth position (1970-1980). Since 
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population growth at 2.5% per annum in the 1970s exceeded 
the GNP growth of 1.3% per annum, per capita incomes has 
been declining roughly 1.2% (World Development Report, 
1982). The aggregate rate of profit in the manufacturing 
sector declined since 1948, and severe declines were 
recorded in the period 1981-1986 (Moll, 1990). This 
deterioration in economic performance can be attributed 
to the increasing resistance against apartheid both 
domestically and internationally and to the adverse 
international developments and inappropriate domestic 
economic policies. Institutional arrangements to reduce 
transaction costs must be mutually beneficial to both 
sides of the transaction or they will fail. There was 
increasing evidence to Africans that arrangements were no 
longer mutually beneficial. 
Low economic growth rates led to even lower growth 
rates of employment. Since 1975, the South African 
economy's capacity to absorb its rapidly growing labor 
force has dramatically been depressed; the labor force 
has grown by about 4. 6 mi 11 ion since then, al though 
formal employment has only increased by 1.1 million. Thus 
three and half million more people were forced to be 
dependent on the informal sector and subsistence 
agriculture or to remain unemployed (McGrath & Van der 
Berg, 1991). According to McGrath and Van der Berg 
( 1991), blacks were more seriously affected than the 
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other groups; low growth ensured that poverty increased 
for them although wages were rising due to the strong 
bargaining by the trade unions. 
The non-racial trade union movement grew 
tremendously in the 1970s as the manufacturing base grew. 
There emerged a layer of educated Africans who were 
entering industry with skills. McGrath and Knight (1977) 
have argued that in South Africa, wage increases for 
black workers in the 1970s were a result of institutional 
pressures and interventions and a rising skill 
composition of employment, rather than a result of market 
scarcity. The low rate of growth of employment in the 
1980s has restricted the gains from economic growth to a 
smaller and smaller share of the population. Furthermore, 
although there are signs of emerging integration in the 
labor market, particularly in capital intensive 
industries such as chemical and automobile, black workers 
still remain crowded in lower skilled occupations while 
white workers dominate in the managerial, technical and 
supervisory grades of employment (Hindson and Crankshaw, 
1990). Integration seems faster in recent years and 
particularly in multinational corporations. These 
companies have been forced by various employment codes 
such as the Sullivan Code for US multinationals to 
provide for equal employment opportunities. This has had 
a trickle down effect as major industrial companies 
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realize that to compete effectively in the market they 
need to rid out the "bottlenecks". 
3.4 Interest Groups and Apartheid 
In Chapter 1, I argued that interest groups politics 
may be properly understood only when the particular 
process of contest for political and economic rights in 
the society concerned is analyzed in detail. In this 
section I concentrate on the white trade union movement 
and big business who have had a role in influencing state 
policy. The analysis of African interest groups is beyond 
the scope of this paper and I will treat them as one 
represented by their umbrella body, the Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM). The MDM is a loose alliance of African 
interest groups, including the ANC, the churches, African 
capitalists, the trade unions and many others. 
The nature and activities of the interest groups are 
strongly influenced by the sociocultural environment 
within which they exist. In South Africa this environment 
is a culturally heterogeneous society governed by a 
minority apartheid regime. The existence of racial and 
ethnic interest groups reflects the clash of interest, 
whose structure is reinforced by apartheid legislation. 
It is important to keep in mind that the activities of 
certain interest groups reinforced racial and ethnic 
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cleavages and the structural rigidity of the political 
system. 
The majority of the South African interest groups 
are functionally specific organizations promoting and 
defending the goals of particular segments of society. 
The most prominent commercial interest groups are the 
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) and the Association of 
Chamber of Commerce (ASSOCOM). The South African 
Federated Chamber of Industries ( FCI) and the South 
African Chamber of Mines represent industry and mining 
sectors. The commercial and industrial groups are 
concerned with a capitalist economic system and take an 
active part in the ongoing debate about the economic 
aspects of the implementation of apartheid. They also 
articulate the interests of employers in the private 
sector. 
The right-wing white trade unions have been the 
vehicle of Afrikaner political aspirations.a The history 
of the implementation of the NP labor policy in the 1950s 
and 1960s abounds with examples of its extreme 
sensitivity to the sentiments and interests of the 
organized white workers. 
Bin 1923 the NP under Hertzog and the Labour Party 
established in 1919 as a political wing of the trade unions - under 
Cresswell entered into an election pact. The NP won the 1924 
elections and Cresswell became the minister of labor. This alliance 
took different forms as the years passed electing the NP in 1948 
and disappearing from the scene thereafter. 
80 
The formal channels of access to the bureaucracy 
include a large variety of statutory boards, commissions 
and councils which not only provide a forum for 
negotiation between the bureaucracy and the interest 
groups, but also an integrated part of the executive arm 
of the central government. These boards, commissions and 
councils are usually constituted in such a way that they 
are representatives of relevant interest groups. Examples 
are numerous: control boards of agricultural commodities, 
the National Transport Commission, the South African 
Medical and Dental Council. 
Generally, the channels of access described here are 
not available to black associational interest groups, 
although meetings with government officials do take 
place. Africans rejected the homelands as appendages of 
apartheid which they resisted from the onset. This has 
been an anathema to apartheid. As the South African 
economy grew, the network of interdependence widened the 
impersonal exchange process giving considerable scope for 
all kinds of opportunistic behavior by bureaucrats and 
increasing the costs of transacting. The lack of 
legitimate institutions through which Africans could 
channel their interests has been the source of social and 
political instability. Consequently, the apartheid 
institutional coordinating framework has broken down in 
the face of new demands by the African majority that have 
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been excluded. New institutions must allow them to 
participate or problems will continue. In the past decade 
the strong apartheid alliance of the white trade unions, 
white capitalists and the minority NP government 
witnessed the crumbling of their institution with 
disbelief as Africans mobilized domestically and 
internationally to isolate South Africa and force the 
state to the table to negotiate new institutions for a 
new democratic South Africa with Africans as equal 
partners. 
3.5. Porous State Intervention? 
Evidence shows that state intervention in South 
Africa was pervasive during its development process. 
Naturally, some neoclassical economists have tried to put 
forward explanations of the South African experience 
which try to reconcile the existence of state 
intervention with the growth of the economy. 
Bhagwati has proposed a theory of prescriptive state 
intervention in an attempt to resolve the dilemma of an 
interventionist state in a rapidly growing economy by 
characterizing the Korean state as a "dos" (prescriptive) 
state, as opposed to a "don·· ts" (proser ipt i ve ) state 
( Bhagwati, 1982). According to Bhagwati ( 1982), "al though 
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a prescriptive state may prescribe as badly as a 
proscriptive state proscribes, a proscriptive state will 
tend to stifle initiative whereas a prescriptive state 
will tend to leave open areas outside of the prescription 
where initiative can be exercised". 
On a superficial level, it is hardly objectionable 
that an obstructive state will not be very helpful for 
business, and by implication, economic growth. However, 
on closer examination there are problems with the theory 
of porous state intervention. In a world with scarce 
resources and therefore faced with opportunity costs, 
doing something means not doing something else. In this 
world, saying "do" A is often equivalent to saying 
"don ~t" do 'not A~. There can be no presumption that 
saying ·'do" A ("don -·t" do 'not A~) will allow more 
initiatives than saying "don·"t" do A ("do" 'not~ A). A 
prescriptive state can be as stifling as a proscriptive 
one, since it can make private enterprises do many things 
against their will that they are left with little 
resources to do what they want, even if these activities 
are not explicitly forbidden (Chang, 1990). Likewise a 
proscriptive state can allow a lot of initiative if it 
proscribes against only a few things. If we adopt the 
Liberal concept of negative freedom, we may say that one 
has less freedom under a prescriptive state than under a 
proscriptive one, because private enterprises with a 
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government prescription are coerced to execute the 
prescription, whereas the private enterprise with a state 
proscription are not coerced into any particular action 
and therefore can chose the best option from whatever is 
not forbidden by the state, and thereby exercise 
"initiatives" (Chang, 1990). 
The South African state actions have been relatively 
mixed. In the period after the World War Two there was a 
strong focus on heavy and chemical industries, with the 
public enterprises taking a lead in directing investment 
in less risky and more profitable consumer goods 
industries such as Armscor, Eskom, Iscor and SASOL. 
However, in the late 1980s the state attempted to 
privatize some of its industries giving the private 
sector more choices for initiative, an action vehemently 
opposed by the labor movement. It has not only been the 
state that has been prescriptive, it is reported in 
economic journals the and magazines such as Forbes that 
most business activities are prohibited unless expressly 
approved by the board. Thus it can be argued that the 
South African state has been proscriptive without serious 
qualification. 
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3.6. Was the Apartheid Bureaucracy Self-Seeking? 
The apartheid system created institutions which were 
to lower costs and lead to economic advancement for 
whites. These costs included those of information, 
negotiation, monitoring, coordination and enforcement of 
contracts. To minimize these costs the state created a 
bureaucracy including the military and the police. To the 
extent that the apartheid system is based on economic 
rationality, that is, the system works to increase the 
incomes of those groups whose votes are important for the 
polity, the bureaucracy is used for redistributive 
purposes rather than for the maintenance of law and order 
or the provision of services to the public. The 
activities of the bureaucracy are of the directly 
unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) type (Bhagwati, 1982) 
The economic effects of creating a DUP bureaucracy 
can be analyzed with the aid of the model developed in 
Lundahl (1982). To the extent that the resources going 
into DUP activities consist of skilled labor and capital 
that would otherwise have been used by mining and 
manufacturing, white farmer interests stand to gain for 
draining mining and manufacturing of skilled labor and 
capital depressing the unskilled wage rate as well. 
Africans move into the agricultural sector where the 
return to both land and capital increases. The loss of 
85 
skilled labor hurts mining and manufacturing capitalists 
since this tends to exert downward pressure on the return 
to capital. The transfer of industrial capital into 
bureaucratic activities increases the factor's marginal 
revenue product in mining and manufacturing, but to the 
extent that this transfer is affected by taxing the 
capitalists, the gain is wiped out. 
The most interesting effects of creating the 
apartheid bureaucracy are those on skilled wages. The 
increased demand for skilled labor emanating from the 
bureaucracy creates an upward pressure on the wage level, 
but this effect is swamped by the loss of capital in the 
sector, assuming that the wage paid to the bureaucrats 
equals what they would earn working in mining and 
manufacturing. If so, this could contribute to an 
increase in the pressure from white labor unions to keep 
Africans out of skilled jobs in order to boost the wage 
level again. Thus not only will unskilled Africans lose 
from the reduction of their wages caused by the loss of 
capital and skilled labor in mining and manufacturing, 
but crowding effects may be present as well. 
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3.7. State-created Rents and Industrial Development 
If the world operates like the model of perfect 
competition, the governments of developing countries 
should not deliberately seek to develop new industries, 
because it means, ceteris paribus, a less efficient use 
of resources. However, the fact that an industry is 
unprofitable in a developing country at present prices 
does not mean that it should not be promoted, as the 
success of the Korean steel industry and the Japanese 
automobile industry testify (Amsden, 1989). 
In the context of late development, whereby a 
country develops on the basis of borrowed technologies, 
if a technology can be put to work, the industry could 
become much more profitable than in the more developed 
country where the technology originated. This is partly 
because the borrower does not necessarily pay the full 
cost of developing the technology but also because they 
can combine the technology with cheaper labor. Of course, 
not all producers who borrow technology become more cost-
effective than the lenders of technology, and are often 
less cost-effective than the latter. The firms in the 
late-developing countries do not have access to the 
"social capital" (skill of the workforce and 
infrastructure), for which the latter of developed 
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countries do not pay the full cost (Abramovitz, 1986). 
The industrial policy measures used by the South 
African state are not radically different in kind from 
those often associated with economic failure in many 
developing countries. One danger of industrial policy is 
that it may, by opening up opportunities to acquire 
wealth through unproductive activities such as influence 
peddling or the diversion of entrepreneurial efforts away 
from productive activities. This 
argument. Rent-seeking costs 
is the rent-seeking 
are fundamentally 
transaction costs expended in the process of seeking 
rents and involves activities like information 
collection, influence peddling and bargaining, and have 
to be strictly differentiated from the rent itself, which 
is a pure transfer. Therefore, the mere existence of 
state-created rents, and the opportunity of rent-seeking 
do not mean that resources will actually be spent on 
rent-seeking. For example, if the firm can acquire rents 
through bribing and if there is little "second-tier" 
rent-seeking, the actual amount of resources "spent" on 
rent-seeking may not be large. 
The South African government has been subject to 
interest group influences, particularly that of the 
conglomerates and white trade unions. Although the 
practice has produced some undesirable distributional 
consequences, limiting the opportunity of rent-seeking to 
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the conglomerates seems to have reduced rent-seeking 
costs in South Africa. When a small number of people have 
exclusive access to rents, rent seeking activities will 
be less frequent and of smaller magnitude, because others 
may not join the rent-seeking contests, knowing that they 
have little chance of success to influence the state. The 
fact that conglomerates have a stake in multiple markets 
also reduces rent-seeking costs by the "bundling of 
issues". 
Even when the potential "waste" of rent-seeking is 
fully realized, rent-seeking is not the biggest danger of 
using state created rents for industrial development. 
Once a rent is created, it is highly likely that an 
"entry barrier" will be set around the "rent market", 
which will discourage the potential entrants from 
spending resources to dislodge the incumbent. A more 
serious danger of state-created rent is that state 
intervention may protect or even encourage inefficient 
producers or production methods, with long lasting 
efficiency consequences. 
The most serious problem with industrial policy is 
that, once implemented, state-created rents may be 
difficult to withdraw due to political pressure. The 
existence of "infant" industries which refuse to grow 
such as Mossgas is another case in point (Bell, 1984). As 
emphasized by economists like Marx, Schumpeter and many 
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others, the beneficial role of rents, as means to lure 
and force firms into more productive activities, hinges 
on the fact that no rent accruing to the innovator is 
permanent (Chang, 1990). 
The South African state finds itself at crossroads 
because of the constitutional negotiation with the 
African representatives. Consequently, the key role that 
the state has played in directing the economy has 
diminished. It remains to be seen what role the state is 
going to play during transition to democracy and what new 
institutions are going to be created to ensure smooth 
institutional changes. 
3.8 Can A Singular Political Community Emerge? 
President F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela of the 
African National Congress (ANC) agree: The present 
administration from which South Africa's African majority 
is excluded must be replaced by a provisional government 
by 1994. But while they concur on the need for a more 
broadly based provisional government, they cannot even 
agree on a name for it. De Klerk's governing National 
Party (NP) refers to a transitional government, while 
Mandela, s ANC prefers to talk of an interim government of 
national unity. Can a nation be built, fashioned 
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according to the Western European templates that overlaid 
the great nineteenth-century political ideologies of 
nationalism, liberalism and socialism? 
The negotiation process deadlocked in May 1992 on 
how much majority of an elected national assembly would 
be needed to ratify a new constitution. The de Klerk bloc 
wanted a 75 percent majority. The ANC had wanted a 66.66 
percent majority, but compromised to 70 percent after 
behind closed doors. However, the agreement was not 
forthcoming. The reason was simple and compelling: 
Neither side was sure of the extent of support it would 
win in the scheduled election to the national assembly; 
both were anxious that they might have given too much 
(Laurence, 1992). 
The continuing violence and the desire of all 
parties to reach a speedy solution resulted in an all 
party meeting in March 1993 to resume talks about talks. 
The Pan African Congress \PAC - an exclusivist African 
nationalist movement) and the Conservative Party (CP - an 
exclusivist Afrikaner nationalist party and the official 
opposition in the apartheid parliament) who had earlier 
boycotted the meetings about talks attended. Though 
parties are still far apart, they have committed 
themselves to a peaceful resolution of the South African 
conflict. Dangers of coercion in a reconstituted South 
Africa are still looming, however. First, the creation of 
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an all inclusive political community within a unified 
democratic state will require repression of those who 
would foster exclusive nationalisms, but such repression 
only furthers the cause of nationalism. Second, 
protection of the fiscal base of the state, the 
capitalist economy, will require repressing many of the 
classes of those who are currently excluded from the 
formal economy. Some ameliorative measures are likely to 
be put in place, but no large-scale and fundamental 
distribution can occur without the agreement of big 
capital. That is not likely to be forthcoming. But 
repression of such demands can foster the emergence of 
destabilizing revolutionary movements. 
Conclusion 
The realization that there are different paths to 
development influenced South African policymakers to 
design policies in terms of the attainment of specific 
and identifiable goals which were consciously selected in 
accordance with particular societal assets, capabilities 
and institutional constraints. Institutional arrangements 
used by the apartheid regime were a rich mix of private 
and public instrumentalities. The state played a big role 
in overcoming the "poor white" problem in South Africa. 
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However, the World War Two boom which had the South 
Africa manufacturing output growing at the rate of 7% per 
annum and the exclusion of African workers from 
particular skills and industries made the state· s task an 
easy one. 
However, the state failed to anticipate the 
unintended consequences of its scheme. With the high 
manufacturing output growth huge numbers of Africans were 
assimilated into the formal economy and in the process 
mobilized themselves into organizations. These African 
organizations undermined the state plan and increased the 
transaction and information costs for the state. In the 
face of these new demands the apartheid institutional 
coordinating framework crumbled. New institutions should 
allow African to participate as equal partners. 
Since South Africa stands to benefit from a 
democratically elected government with the scrapping of 
sanctions and the opening of markets in the African 
continent there are opportunities for state deployment of 
industrial promotion. If the incentives are correctly 
structured by the state and if international demand for 
tradable goods is buoyant, possibilities of a sustainable 
level of growth are eminent. Even if other strategies 
provide a simultaneous impetus for growth, like inward 
industrialization, a successful export performance will 
be a necessary condition for growth in the long run, 
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given the high propensity to import in the South African 
economy. 
On the level of macroeconomic performance the need 
to raise the level of investment is clear for South 
Africa, as it is a necessary condition for higher growth 
of output. For investment, a climate of stability and 
confidence must prevail, and there must be a commitment 
on the part of the government to policies that foster 
economic growth. Also the international and the South 
African experience shows that the excessive ongoing use 
of debt cannot be made of foreign savings. Borrowing from 
abroad can, however, provide the cushion necessary for 
reviving a process necessary for economic growth. Foreign 
borrowing can provide space to revive domestic investment 
before domestic savings recover. However, all these 
possibilities depend on the stability or evolutionary 
transformation of different institutions in South Africa. 
What institutional forms can allow South Africa to 
achieve a sustainable level of development at low 
transaction and information costs'? This is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
94 
CHAPTER 4 
Rethinking the Role of the State and the Market 
Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for more rapid development in South 
Africa is the innovation of efficient political 
institutions. Since South Africa is experiencing deep 
social, racial and ethnic divisions there is an urgent 
need for a political compromise. A compromise may ensure 
state effectiveness and flexibility in responding to both 
domestic and international challenges facing a democratic 
South Africa. First, I discuss the world economic 
conditions and then discuss different prescriptions that 
could be redundant by a democratic state. Second, I 
discuss how Sweden, Denmark, and Norway overcame their 
strong societal divisions and low economic growth rates 
at some stage of their development and what lessons South 
Africa can learn from their experience. Finally, I 
discuss the urgent need of a political compromise and the 
importance of innovating political institutions as the 
new institutional economics argues. I conclude that for 
South Africa a political system remains an arena for new 
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innovation in economic policy and institutional analysis 
of the polity and the economy underlines the obstacles 
that stand in the way of a compromise. Furthermore, 
economic performance is not entirely a matter of fate or 
the product of iron laws in economics but the 
institutions that effect the performance of the economy 
and distribute power in society are ultimately artifacts 
of political action. They are constructed out of 
political struggles and from time to time may be recast. 
4.1. Conditions of the World Economy 
The world economy today is no longer in an 
expansionary phase. There has been a dramatic fall in the 
demand for unskilled labor and raw material per unit of 
industrial production. Consequently, developing countries 
in the 1990s face an external environment more hostile 
than in any previous decade since the Second World War 
(IMF, 1992). They are doubly squeezed on trade and on 
capital. Growth in world output slowed from 4.1 percent 
in 1970-79 to 2.6 percent in 1980-87. Terms of trade for 
non-fuel exports from developing countries deteriorated 
from 1.1 percent per year decline in the 1970-1979 to a 
1.7 percent decline in 1980-87 (UNCTAD, 1987). Protection 
in developed country markets has increased since the 
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early 1970s, accelerating in the early 1980s to the point 
where by 1986, 21 percent of manufactured goods imported 
into the US and Europe were restricted by quantitative 
barriers (UNCTAD, 1987). Wade (1990) argues that this 
protection is being applied with special discrimination 
against developing countries. Meanwhile the 
microelectronics revolution has reduced the advantage of 
cheap labor sites, slowing the inflow of direct foreign 
investment to developing countries at large (Wade, 1990). 
On top of these trends has come a sharp increase in 
the volatility of the international economy due to the 
slow progress of the Uruguay Round of talks and therefore 
much more uncertainty facing developing countries 
governments and producers. With the internationalization 
and deregulation of financial markets, financial capital 
is ricocheting around the world. Governments~ ability to 
control is diminishing, and long-term investment is 
depressed. 
Faced with these new dangers and opportunities, what 
broad lines of economic policy should South Africa 
follow? Developmental state planning policies and export 
oriented industrialization of the East Asian kind will 
have a smaller effect than they did in East Asia, if for 
no other reason than the less favorable conditions of the 
international economy. On the other hand this does not 
mean that free market policies with no intervention are 
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the better alternative. Institutional innovation as the 
new institutional economics argues may provide 
opportunities for successful development. 
The new institutional economics attempts to 
transcend the structuralist developmental economics which 
downplayed the role of markets in the development 
process. At the same time, it also attempts to transcend 
subsequent neoclassical resurgence that interpret all 
successful development episodes as the outcome of free 
markets. To propose market-oriented and state-led 
development as alternatives is simply ahistorical and 
misleading. All successful cases of "late" 
industrialization have been associated with significant 
degree of state intervention (Deyo, 1987; Amsden, 1989; 
Wade, 1990). The problem for South Africa is to find the 
appropriate mixture of market orientation and government 
intervention consistent with rapid and efficient 
industrialization. Equally central is the issue of which 
set of institutional and political arrangements is 
compatible with the appropriate mix of state intervention 
and market orientation in the economy. Hence the 
institutional economics shift the problem from the state-
versus-market dichotomy towards how these organizational 
differences contribute to the contrast in both policies 
implemented and the subsequent economic performance. 
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4.2. Institutional Challenges for South Africa 
The apartheid state promoted itself as long-term 
solutions to the political order and as a best possible 
mode of governance for the South African society, 
especially when compared to the impotent and divided 
parliamentary democracies of Western Europe and to the 
prepotent and monolithic regime in the former Soviet 
Union (Ashford, 1992). From its inception apartheid had 
limitations. These limitations were in part imposed by 
the extant world ideas and by enduring domestic 
aspirations of the African majority, both of which 
implied that legitimate political domination could only 
be the expression of popular sovereignty or, in 
exceptional cases, a revolutionary mandate for a drastic 
social transformation. 
Whites broadly speaking are increasingly opposed to 
the South African arbetura since conflicts and 
uncertainties have manifested themselves, particularly 
the ongoing violence between members of the ANC and 
Inkatha (an ethno-nationalistic Zulu organization). Some 
whites and a section of African homeland leaders who have 
benefitted from apartheid and the state economic 
policies, face challenges of either retaining or changing 
the status quo rules. Some actors within the ruling bloc 
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fear that the transition and political democracy are 
bound to lead to the withering of the white race and are 
bound to force at any cost a return to the "good old 
times" of "order", "social peace and "respect for 
authority". The state is placed in a powerful position of 
providing information that will affect individuals 
whether or not a change in rules will produce a net 
benefit. Whether an individual perceives any benefits to 
be derived from a change in rules or not will depend on 
the objective conditions, the type of information that 
the current institutional arrangements generate and make 
available to individuals and the rules proposed as an 
alternative. Information about benefits must be first 
identified, organized and analyzed. 
In South Africa, economic problems are political 
problems. Contemporary economic di ff icul ties and the 
attempts to find solutions to them cannot be analyzed in 
isolation from associated political dilemmas. To be 
pursued effectively, any policy mix must be politically 
viable first and then economically viable. In the past 
decade group conflict intensified. Competition for a 
share of national resources grew as the increment of new 
resources available each year shrank. Faced with the new 
demands from the Africans who were excluded from the 
polity, the apartheid institutional framework began to 
fall apart causing both transaction and information costs 
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to increase. The state was forced to find another 
mechanism for managing political and economic conflict. 
With the increased conflict the National Party (NP) 
government has turned towards greater reliance on the 
market for economic resources and the apportioning of 
economic sacrifice. 
However, the new institutional economics suggests 
that some aspects of the distinctions between state-led 
economic direction and a market strategy are illusory. 
Markets are themselves institutions whose effectiveness 
varies with the configuration just as the effectiveness 
of public policy does. Moreover, many markets depend on 
an auxiliary network of social institutions often 
generated and sustained by the state action in order to 
function effectively. Hence the withdrawal of the state 
can never be complete and precipitate attempts to 
accomplish it may impair national markets more than they 
help them. If markets tend to move toward a state of 
equilibrium, political initiatives may well determine 
whether that equilibrium is at high or low levels of 
productivity and output. Moreover, there is some evidence 
that market strategies may intensify the level of social 
conflict with which many governments will have to 
ultimately have to deal (Smith, 1991). Economic sacrifice 
as apportioned by the market has fallen predominantly on 
those who lack market power to protect themselves such as 
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young school leavers, immigrants, the unskilled and the 
older workers in declining sectors. Many governments have 
calculated that an underclass of this sort cannot pose a 
serious challenge to social order or their own electoral 
fortunes (Hall, 1986). Nevertheless, the potential of a 
market strategy remains uncertain in view of potential 
social unrest. 
4.3. A Democratic Compromise. 
The new institutional economics suggests five sets 
of structural variables for the course of a nation· s 
economic policy: the organization of labor, the 
organization of capital, the organization of the state, 
the organization of the political system and the 
structural position of the country within the 
international economy. The kind of explanatory variables 
emphasized by the new institutional economics refer to 
precisely those features of the political scene that are 
likely to weigh heavily in the minds of the decision-
makers. Perhaps South Africa could learn from European 
countries that were faced with more or less similar 
challenges in their stages of development. 
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4.3.1. The European Experience 
The corporatist arrangements in Europe have their 
origin in the catastrophic changes of the 1930s and the 
1940s. The concept of democratic corporatism refers to 
the economic and political organization of modern 
capitalism. It is distinguished by three traits: an 
ideology of social partnership expressed at the national 
level; a relatively centralized and concentrated system 
of interest groups; and voluntary and informal 
organization of conflicting objectives through continuous 
political bargaining between interest groups, state 
bureaucracies, and political parties. 
The "historical compromise" that business and labor 
negotiated broadened conceptions of class interests to 
include an acute awareness of the fragility of the 
European state in a hostile world. An increasingly 
liberal international economy in the postwar years 
offered daily confirmation of that awareness 
(Katzenstein, 1985). International competition 
intensified, underlying the enormous benefits of limiting 
domestic conflicts over economic issues. Against great 
odds the small European states succeeded in restructuring 
the political bases of their regimes along corporatist 
lines. They did so through fits and starts. 
Experimentation prevailed over grandiose political plan 
or deliberate deficit spending ( Katzenstein, 1985). Novel 
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policies created new political possibilities for forging 
alliances across different sectors of society: between 
farmers and workers, between workers and Catholics, and 
between blue and white-collar workers. In reacting to the 
Depression, political extremism, and the threat of war, 
political forces in the European states accommodated 
themselves to the need to overhaul rather than to defend 
or overthrow capitalist society. That accommodation 
provided the political foundation for a democratic 
corporatism which emerged fully after 1945. 
The political alliance between farmers and workers, 
typical of all three Scandinavian states was formed in 
Sweden in 1932. That year the Social Democrats presented 
a program stressed the need for both public works and 
agricultural supports because workers and farmers 
depended on each other's buying power ( Katzenstein, 
1985). The breakdown of the Weimar regime in 1933 in the 
midst of an economic crisis impressed on Swedish leaders 
the need for quick and decisive action (Rustow, 1955). 
The Swedish business community acquiesced in a Social 
Democratic government higher labor costs, a relatively 
expansive fiscal policy, and a growth of welfare services 
in exchange for labor peace, the continuation of private 
control over property and capital markets and openness to 
the world economy (Gourevitch, 1984). This was a 
"historical compromise," Swedish-style, between business 
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and labor. 
Al though the Social Democrats came to power in 
Denmark earlier than in Sweden, Danish political 
developments were on the whole rather similar (Oakley, 
1972). The Depression brought Danish agriculture to the 
brink of collapse and increased unemployment among 
industrial workers to over 40 percent by 1933 
(Katzenstein, 1985). Government proposed legislation 
fixing wages for one year, but support for the proposed 
legislation required political concessions to political 
opponents. An agreement included a further 10 percent 
devaluation, a variety of policies designed to help 
agriculture as demanded by farmers and support of the 
Social Democrats wage legislation, and a variety of new 
social programs stressing relief and public works. 
Social Democracy in Norway was much more radical 
than in Denmark (Larsen, 1948). Its success, however, in 
forming a new societal alliance with agriculture was 
remarkably similar. Following the Danish example, the 
Norwegian Social Democrats adopted a program stressing 
job creation, welfare reform and agricultural subsidies. 
The party campaigned in 1933 with the slogan "work for 
all". Its program was rewarded by the party's best-ever 
showing at the polls. The unions responded; they 
decreased strikes to give the new policies a chance of 
success. In 1935 the Social Democrats made a formal 
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agreement with the Agrarian party to support the reform 
program and pragmatism became the order of the day. The 
rapid transformation from labor radicalism to reformism 
and the urge to form a lasting alliance with agriculture 
received a powerful stimulus from the fascist tendencies 
of farmers supporting the Conservative party and from the 
support of extreme right-wing movements who appeared to 
be gaining support in the early 1930s. In Norway, as in 
other small European states, the deterioration of 
international and domestic conditions strongly reinforced 
the pressure of cooperation. 
New political alliances also emerged in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. In these three countries, 
labor movements, though weaker than those in Scandinavia 
in the mid-1930s, also pushed hard for the adoption of 
concerted crisis plans. The debate over political options 
and the implementation of concrete crisis measures 
resulted in the same outcome as in Scandinavia: new 
political alliances between different social sectors, 
alliances that provided the political foundation for the 
democratic corporatism of the postwar period. 
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4.3.2. Lessons for South Africa: Democratic Corporatism 
and Institutions. 
If the postwar period history of these economic and 
social policies and their implementation tells us 
anything, it tells us that institutions count. Types of 
political economies predict the kinds of policies 
governments adopt; even more, how effectively and 
persistently policies are implemented. The linkage of 
major economic and political actors in corporatist 
bargaining 
encourages 
systems 
those 
facilitates policy linkages; it 
tradeoff s that improve economic 
performance. Channels for talk become channels for 
consistent action. The countries, postwar experience 
illustrates why democratic corporatism need not 
necessarily be considered an anathema to the left who 
associate all corporatism with the repression or 
exclusion of labor (Katzenstein, 1985). 
South Africa faces similar conditions as the 
European states in the 1930s and 1940s. There are such 
deep social and ethnic divisions that political 
compromise is crucial. Business, labor, conservative and 
progressive political parties must impose strict limits 
on domestic quarrels and face the challenges of the 
changing world. If South Africa is to overcome her 
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social, racial and ethnic divisions then the importance 
of centralized and concentrated institutions is 
necessary. The importance of centralized and concentrated 
institutions lies in their shielding a particular style 
of political bargaining. Bargaining is voluntary, 
informal and continuous. It achieves a coordination of 
conflicting objectives among political actors. Political 
sectors of policy are traded off one against another. 
Victory or defeat on any given issue does not lead to an 
escalation of conflict because a continuous sequence of 
political bargains make all actors aware that victory 
today can easily turn into defeat tomorrow. The 
predictability of the process enhances flexibility of the 
actors (Katzenstein, 1985). Hence democratic corporatism 
could bridge the social, racial and ethnic differences 
and ensure a sense of belonging so that South Africa 
could be counted in the world of nations. 
Institutions of a sort outlined above highlight the 
complexity of the polity. The nature of interdependence 
has two sides, both the effects of interlocking 
institutional arrangements. On the one hand, the matrix 
of incentives facing most political actors; on the other 
hand, each policy is likely to have consequences beyond 
the initial sphere of action as a result of institutional 
linkage. The new institutional economics suggests that 
the actions of individuals will be affected by the 
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institutional structure within which they operate; but 
neither institutions nor actions are dictated by the 
existence of superordinate "system" with a status beyond 
that of the institutions themselves. Therefore the 
institutional structure should take priority over 
function in any explanation of political behavior (Hall, 
1986). 
Democratic corporatism should leave room for the 
political system, understood as a complex of political 
organizations that compete for off ice or the right to 
represent the views of social groups and the rules under 
which they operate. The configuration of a political 
system is important because it is the principal avenue 
through which the electorate can influence the direction 
of economic policy. Political parties, in particular, 
have played a role in the introduction of new economic 
policies. The ability to offer such solutions is an 
important source of political appeal, and as we have 
seen, the South African government was often mindful of 
them to build coalitions within the white electorate. 
Both the importance and the limits of the apartheid 
experimentation can be seen in many directions that the 
NP government embarked on over the past four decades. The 
attempts by the NP tell us something about the political 
system: it may be the single most important source of 
policy innovation. If Keynes played a crucial role in the 
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development of the system of economic management that 
bears his name, full acceptance of his ideas depended 
heavily on the advantages that politicians saw in them to 
affect class compromise as well as managing the economy. 
As in a complex tort case, it is difficult to apportion 
responsibility for innovation in economic policy 
precisely (Hall, 1985). 
macroeconomic management 
Initially, new 
are usually 
systems 
devised 
of 
by 
economists. But this is an instance in which we must 
distinguish between invention and dissemination. Just as 
the invention of a new machine was not as important to 
the industrial revolution as their dissemination, so the 
crucial step here is the one which popularizes a new 
economic idea and translates it into policy. Politicians 
not only exercise de Jure control of that step, in many 
cases they take a much more active role in policy 
development. 
This role has important implications for the policy 
dynamics because politicians respond to somewhat a 
different set of incentives than civil servants. In 
particular, they are much more mindful of the political 
consequences of policy for public authority and their own 
capacity to build social coalitions within the political 
arena. To the extent that politicians play a greater role 
in the process, new policies are likely to be selected as 
much for their social implication as for their technical 
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proficiency. These cases suggest that we might want to 
revise our understanding of how social learning takes 
place within the policy process. Social learning should 
not be seen as the preserve of the bureaucracy. It 
involves both officials and politicians. And if 
difficulties are from the technical successes and 
failures of past policies, politicians are more concerned 
with implications of policies for the broader moral 
visions of equity and efficiency that they present to the 
electorate. At the same time there is a need for checks 
and balances that monitor the performance of politicians. 
Politicians can also maximize their own interests or 
embark on ego trips that promote themselves at the 
expense of the country. 
4.3.3. A Strangled Goose 
South Africa faces a crucial choice of faster 
economic development and well defended civil and 
political rights. A democratic South Africa will have 
important consequences, both for the economy of the 
country and for the African economy. The size and stage 
of development of the South African economy makes this a 
challenge and an opportunity for the other countries of 
the African continent. In 1989 South Africa accounted for 
about 22 per cent of total GDP, 29 per cent of the total 
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merchandise exports, but only 6 per cent of the 
population of the continent (United Nations, 1992). 
The financial sector is integrated with world 
financial markets, and South Africa is likely to become 
the center of Africa in the future. It also has 
scientific and educational resources that could make it 
an important growth pole for the continent. The regional 
relations will also be boosted by the ending of apartheid 
and the lifting of economic sanctions. The first signs 
are already there. Trade of South Africa with the rest of 
Africa increased by 40 per cent in 1989 and 22 to 30 per 
cent in 1990 (United Nations, 1992). 
Despite the rosy picture presented above, South 
Africa faces more tougher challenges. The South African 
economy faces a 42.6 per cent rate of unemployment (The 
Economist, 1993). Chris Sta ls, the governor of the 
Reserve Bank of South Africa reckons that in the second 
half of 1992 the economy produced eight jobs for every 
100 young people entering the labor market. This year it 
will produce none, and some of the people in work will 
lose their jobs (The Economist, 1993). In addition to the 
growing unemployment there is an urgent need for wage and 
pension parity. According to the Race Relation Survey 
(1991) unskilled white workers earn three times the wage 
of unskilled black workers. Therefore there is a need to 
reconcile these wage differentials. In circumstances like 
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these, says Zach de Beer, the leader of the Democratic 
Party, even if the Angel Gabriel were put in charge of 
the next government he would make a mess of it (The 
Economist, 1993). 
In 1992 GDP fell by about 2%, compared with 0.5% in 
1991 and 1990 and there is scant evidence of strong 
growth to come (IMF, 1992). Gross fixed investment after 
falling for ten years is down to a feeble 16% of the GDP, 
only just above the minimum level of 14% required to 
replace worn out machines. Gross savings is shrivelled in 
1992 to an historic low of 17% (The Economist, 1993). 
Inflation is down, but mainly, confesses Derek Keys, the 
finance minister, because the economy is "buggered". 
Some South African problems have been caused by an 
uninspiring world economy, the lackluster world price of 
gold and other metals and the political unrest and 
uncertainty in South Africa. Some local economists argue 
that over-concentration, plus a tax structure that favors 
wealth over income and profit has helped stifle the 
spirit of entrepreneurship (The Economist, 1993). In the 
long run the scope of growth is anybody's guess. Azhar 
Jammine, a renowned economist predicts big economic 
opportunities arising from "social upliftment", such as 
the construction of low cost housing and schools, and the 
provision of roads, sewerage, water and electricity for 
the African townships. Mr Kahn of South African Breweries 
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says the country should easily manage annual growth rates 
of 5% once it enjoys political stability and sound 
economic management. Given a political compromise, South 
Africa could begin to tackle its prostrate economy. The 
problem is that a prostrate economy may itself make a 
safe transition and sound government unattainable. 
The recent commitment by all political parties to a 
peaceful resolution of the South African conflict brings 
South Africa very close to that goal. A democratic 
compromise could provide an opportunity for effective 
political institutions and other difficulties that will 
face a new democratic South African state will allow the 
state more 
institutional 
breathing space 
issues. At the 
for tackling these 
same time, the current 
conditions in the world economy increase the potential of 
institutional innovation to modulate the volatility of 
the world economy on the domestic economy to help firms 
compete internationally, and to force an early entry into 
information technologies. Firms set adrift by government 
inaction may relocate, or they may resort to squeezing 
labor costs and intensify work practice in order to avoid 
losing market share by enlisting the power of the state 
to do so. This higher premium on state policy raises the 
advantages of undertaking the organizational innovations 
needed to support them. Institutional innovation of the 
state bureaucracy enables the state to establish an 
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agency within the central bureaucracy whose 
measure is the industrial and trade profile 
economy and its future growth path (Wade, 1990). 
policy 
of the 
Therefore what we learn is that for South Africa a 
political system remains an arena for new innovation in 
economic policy. Institutional analysis of the polity and 
the economy underlines the obstacles that stand in the 
way of a compromise. But it also reminds us that economic 
performance is not entirely a matter of fate or the 
product of iron laws in economics. The institutions that 
affect the performance of the economy and distribute 
power in society are ultimately artifacts of political 
action. They are constructed out of political struggles 
and from time to time may be recast. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I reviewed the present international 
economic problems. In reviewing the world economy I 
highlighted the slow growth of industrialized countries 
and noted the importance of exported manufactured goods 
by developing countries. What came out from the 
discussion is that developing countries need to 
concentrate on producing manufactured products to be 
internationally competitive. To reach the goal of being 
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internationally competitive, I suggested organizational 
innovation. I discussed the origins of the European 
states and learned that a political compromise is an 
important factor in overcoming domestic quarrels. I 
argued that one way to overcome social,racial and ethnic 
divisions in South Africa is through a political 
compromise. A democratic compromise calls on the state 
and its bureaucracy to play an effective role in 
industrial promotion. 
Institutional innovation of the state bureaucracy 
may enable the state to establish an agency whose center 
is the industrial and trade profile of the economy and 
its growth path. Furthermore, I argued that state 
effectiveness is a function of the range of policy 
options and the flexibility with which those instruments 
are used. The desirable extent of state involvement can 
be measured by a comparative approach when there is a -
consensus about goals, leaving the resulting relative 
importance of public and private sectors to be determined 
as an outcome of the relative efficiencies of each 
sector. To measure the degree of state effectiveness 
goals to met could be specified as industrial 
organizations have shown. Policies that operate through 
market forces are more likely to succeed and therefore 
greater awareness of the complexity of policy-economy 
interactions provides a reason for caution in urging 
116 
policy interventions. What mechanisms of coordination are 
required for a sustained level of economic growth, the 
state, markets or institutions? In the next chapter I 
confront the coordination problem and provide some 
answers. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Market, the State, and Institutions and the Research 
Agenda 
What is a useful way to coordinate economic 
activities of independent, but interdependent agents with 
divergent interests and dispersed knowledge? Classical 
economists concerned themselves with coordination within 
economic enterprises and between economic enterprises. It 
was neoclassical economists who focussed specifically on 
coordination between enterprises. By assuming implicitly 
a complete and costlessly enforced set of property and 
other rights underlying the market, the study of the 
struggle between social groups over the definition of the 
rights system was dropped from the research agenda 
(North, 1990). The hypothetical system of instantaneous 
and costless recontracting administered by the Walrasian 
auctioneer, and the coordination problem within the given 
system of rights was also assumed to be solved at no 
costs. 
Recently economists have become critical of the 
conventional approach. The new Institutional Economics 
looks at not only market coordination but also on non-
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market coordination within and between enterprises and at 
the determinants of scope of individual enterprises. What 
has become increasingly clear is that effective 
coordination both within economic units and between such 
units can only be achieved at a cost. 
By introducing the costs of achieving coordination, 
or transaction costs, we effectively breakaway from the 
neoclassical tradition in which perfect coordination is 
achieved without any costs. In this new framework, the 
market is but one of many possible economic institutions, 
or coordination mechanisms, each of which incurs certain 
transaction costs of different types and magnitudes to 
resolve the coordination problem (Pagano, 1985). 
By regarding the market as just one of many 
alternative economic institutions, we come to realize 
that the efficient operation of the market depends on 
many more institutional arrangements than those which are 
recognized in the neoclassical literature. In the process 
the state plays the role of ultimate guarantor of 
property rights and other legal forms, but also 
intervenes extensively in order to establish the market 
as an institution (Polanyi, 1957; Cease, 1988). The 
seemingly "ins ti tut ion-free" mechanism is sustainable 
only as a part of the complex fabric of various 
institutions (Chang, 1990). 
By recognizing that state intervention carries 
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certain costs, I was able to avoid the naive view of 
state intervention as the ultimate solution to the 
coordination problem. At the same time, by recognizing 
that allocating resources through the market is also 
costly, I was able to reject the biased view of the 
government failure literature which argues that the costs 
of state intervention invariably exceed the costs of 
market transactions. Not only can the state fine-tune the 
price signals in a 
economists, but it 
manner prescribed by 
can also supersede 
welfare 
private 
transactions, change the institutions and values of the 
society, or even simply draw attention to a "focal point" 
(Chang, 1990). 
The interesting point emerging from the discussion 
is that state intervention needs not be "expensive", as 
implied by the conventional discussion which equates a 
state with higher tax revenue as a more interventionist 
state. Some types of state intervention can improve the 
efficiency of the economy greatly at little cost because 
they have only very modest requirements for information 
processing and bargaining. Fostering credible commitment 
to the coordinated outcome among the parties involved 
need not involve financial transfers, although they may 
help the process. 
The discussion on South Africa showed how the state 
shaped economic organizations by manipulating and 
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enforcing property rights. I discussed how political 
participants who were excluded from the polity directed 
their efforts toward changing rules and norms and not 
short-term utility maximization. I argued that apartheid 
institutions have become "fetters" on the further 
development of the forces of production and an 
appropriate redefinition of property rights is necessary. 
I suggested that a political compromise could minimize 
transaction costs and ensure stability which may attract 
potential investors. 
Emerging from the discussion in the thesis is that 
neither the market nor the state, nor any other economic 
institution is perfect. Each institution has its costs 
and benefits. However, this should not lead us to an 
antagonistic position that therefore we should leave 
things as they evolve. The ultimate challenge is for each 
country to find an appropriate mix of the market, the 
state, and other non-market institutions in coordinating 
the activities of independent, but interdependent, 
economic decision-makers at the minimum possible cost. 
Such a challenge can be met through a process of 
empirical work encompassing 
institutions. 
markets, states and 
Neoclassical economists have introduced econometric 
and mathematical tools to understand how the state 
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functions8 . In their construction of an applied general 
equilibrium model two steps are followed. The first is to 
construct for a given period a "benchmark equilibrium 
data set", which is a collection of data in which 
equilibrium conditions of an assumed underlying 
equilibrium model are satisfied. 
The second is to choose the functional form and 
parameter values for the model. They are chosen in such 
a way that the model is "calibrated" to the benchmark 
equilibrium data set. Depending on the functional forms 
used, the observed equilibrium may not be sufficient to 
determine uniquely the parameter values. Once the 
parameters are chosen, the model is ready to be used for 
policy analysis. Various exogenous variables can be 
changed, and the model can be solved for these changes. 
The difference between the solution values and the values 
in the data set are the estimates of the effects of 
policy change. 
The general equilibrium model as suggested by 
neoclassical economists can help in overcoming the 
transition from theoretical work as I have presented in 
this study to econometric and mathematical models. The 
gap in this study can be filled by empirical research 
that attempt to integrate markets, states and 
s For models of political economy, see Whiteley (1980). Taylor 
(1980) has presented models of growth and distribution. For 
macroeconomic models, see Fair (1984). 
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institutions. However, econometric models should be used 
with greater caution, since there is no obvious way of 
testing whether the model is a good approximation of the 
truth. 
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